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Introduction 
Nowadays family models have developed to be more diverse due to the emergence of atypical 
families and due to the changing parental roles. The changes in parental roles include mainly 
more equal burden-sharing between mothers and fathers within the families, reflecting the 
development of women’s equality rights and women’s equal participation in the labour 
market. Along with the alterations of parental roles, the developments in the sphere of 
adoption rights of same-sex couples or single individuals have changed the perception of 
family models. Furthermore, novel methods for becoming a parent (e.g. via surrogacy
1
 
agreements) have become increasingly popular reflecting the rapid changes in the field of 
reproductive medicine. All these developments bring about the need to adjust the regime of 
parental entitlements to the changing circumstances, especially what concerns entitlements to 
measures facilitating the upbringing of children. 
Among the listed family models, the legal position of the intended/commissioning parents
2
 
and their children born through surrogacy is the most uncertain. The problems relating to 
surrogacy are being further accentuated as commercial surrogacy has become an increasingly 
popular global service
3
 under international surrogacy agreements; the „receiving states“4 
being more from the developed world and the „states of birth“5 consisting more of less 
developed states. While in the states of birth, surrogacy is permissible and regulated – with 
regulation in force regarding the acknowledgment of legal parentage of the intended parents – 
the practice and regulation varies significantly in the receiving states, having consequences on 
                                                          
1
 „Surrogacy occurs where the child is gestated (carried) by someone, namely the surrogate mother, who will 
not be (one of) the person(s) who raise(s) the child, namely the intended parent(s).“ – E.C. di Torella, P. 
Foubert „Surrogacy, pregnancy and maternity rights: a missed opportunity for a more coherent regime of 
parental rights in the EU“ [2015], 40 European Law Review 1, p. 55. 
2
 In the thesis, the term intended parent(s) (see footnote 1) will be used interchangeably with the term 
commissioning parent(s) that has an identical meaning. The term gestational mother will be used to refer to 
the woman that carried the child.  
3
 According to the available information (2014), „several thousand children are likely to be born each year as a 
result of international surrogacy arrangements to intended parents from all regions of the world“ which is 
probably even an underestimated data – see The Hague Conference on Private International Law, “A study of 
legal parentage and the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements,” Preliminary Document No 3 
C of March 2014 for the attention of the Council of April 2014 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, 
accessible at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd03c_en.pdf, para. 129, last accessed 29.04.2016. 
4
 See the list of receiving countries in: The Hague Conference on Private International Law, “A study of legal 
parentage and the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements,” op. cit., para. 132. 
5
 Commercial surrogacy service is legally provided e.g. in India, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Thailand, Mexico 
and in some US states (e.g. California and Illinois). States that have been also mentioned as States of birth, 
although less frequently, are: Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Malaysia and Mexico 
(however, some of the latter states were mentioned as states of birth because the family member lived abroad, 
the surrogacy agreement being altruistic). - The Hague Conference on Private International Law, “A study of 
legal parentage and the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements,” op. cit., para. 130 to 131.  
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these families’ daily arrangements, their entitlements to parental benefits6 and the interests of 
the children thereof due to the cross-border nature of commercial surrogacy agreements. 
Thus, while it is easy to establish e.g. the filiation of the intended parents and their children in 
the birth states, the situation becomes more complicated following the families’ return to the 
receiving states.  
There is currently no consensus among European states on whether, and on what conditions, 
surrogacy should be allowed/recognised as it raises complex ethical and social issues – the 
need to prevent „the exploitation of women and their reproductive functions, and the 
commodification of children“7 on the one hand, balanced against the interests of infertile 
couples on the other. In Mennesson v France the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR) noted that among the thirty-five member States of the Council of 
Europe
8
 (hereinafter also States Parties) studied for the purpose of establishing the existence 
or lack of consensus on the matter, surrogacy is expressly prohibited in fourteen of these 
states
9
; in ten of these it is either prohibited under general provisions or not tolerated, or the 
question of its lawfulness is uncertain; surrogacy is authorised in seven of the States Parties 
and tolerated in four others.
10
 The lack of consensus among European states on the 
recognition of surrogacy has led to diverse outcomes on the recognition of filiation between 
the children and their parents and parental rights of the intended/commissioning parents. This 
in turn also touches upon the issue of equal treatment of the intended/commissioning parents 
vis à vis biological/gestational parents in the field of parental benefits and poses challenges in 
finding the right balance between protecting the interests of the children being raised in such 
families and defending the states’ public policy on surrogacy. 
Other problems in the field of parental benefits relate to the legislation concerning equal 
treatment for men and women. Namely, although parents have been gradually dividing their 
childcare obligations more equally, it has not been fully reflected in the European Union 
(hereinafter EU) legislation concerning the entitlements of mothers and fathers, leading to 
persisting discrepancies between the parents’ involvement in childrearing matters. Hence, 
while one of the objectives of the EU gender equality strategy (2016-2019) is to promote 
                                                          
6
 For the purpose of this thesis, „parental benefits“ should be understood as measures aiming to, fully or 
partially, facilitate the upbringing of children, e.g. maternity/parental leave and measures granted for the reason 
of having (had) children. 
7
 C. Achmad „Children's rights to the fore in the ECtHR's first international commercial surrogacy judgments“ 
[2014], European Human Rights Law Review 6, p. 639. 
8
 Council of Europe has 47 States Parties in total.  
9
 France, the respondent state was not included in the study. However, surrogacy is also prohibited in France. 
10
 Case of Mennesson v France, 26.06.2014, application no. 65192/11, para. 78. 
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„more equal sharing between men and women of time spent on care and household 
responsibilities and to improve possibilities for balancing caring and professional activities“11, 
there still exist differences between the entitlements of men and women to parental benefits 
under the EU legislation aiming to facilitate achieving the listed aims. In the thesis it will be 
argued that the legislation in force in the field of parental benefits and the respective case law 
should focus more on parenting as a social task, aiming to secure the children’s welfare and 
aiming to promote substantive equality between men and women. Thus, there is a need for 
more inclusive regime regarding parental benefits, levelling the entitlements for men and 
women and providing more equal access to these benefits thereof. 
In the thesis, it will be examined to what extent the legislation in force at the EU level as well 
as at the national level has reflected the developments of modern families. For this purpose, 
the thesis will examine the main directives and national legislation in force that regulate 
parental benefits within the meaning of this thesis
12
, including the differential entitlements 
within the meaning of art 157(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
13
 
(hereinafter TFEU). Further, the thesis will focus on the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter CJEU), the ECtHR, national courts and equality bodies in this 
field. The thesis will aim to establish whether the EU legislation, as clarified by the CJEU 
fully adheres to the rights of the children growing up in atypical families, especially in 
families that have resorted to surrogacy, and whether the legislation is capable of fully 
advancing equality rights as envisaged in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union
14
 (hereinafter EUCFR) and the European Convention of Human Rights
15
 (hereinafter 
ECHR). In this regard it will be argued in the thesis that equality rights should include the 
intended parents’ and fathers’ rights to parental benefits insofar as these benefits are aimed to 
protect the children’s best interests, physical/mental and material welfare and relate to tasks 
performed in the parental capacity.  
The relevance of the thesis at the EU level is that the thesis will try to propose ways of 
improving the protection of atypical families’ and fathers’ equality rights in a way that will 
reflect the relevance of human rights protection more adequately. The relevance of the thesis 
                                                          
11
 The European Commission Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/document/files/strategic_engagement_en.pdf, p. 21, Annex 1, last 
accessed 29.04.2016. 
12
 See footnote 6. 
13
 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ [2012] C 326/47. 
14
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ [2012] C 326/391. 
15
 The European Convention on Human Rights, concluded 04.11.1950, entry into force 03.09.1953. 
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for Estonia is that the thesis will verify the minimum protection required under EU anti-
discrimination law in the field of parental benefits and will examine whether Estonia’s 
legislation and practice is in accordance with this level of protection and the aim of the 
respective directives.  
The thesis will primarily be based on the respective EU and national legislation, the relevant 
articles of the ECHR and the case-law of the CJEU and the ECtHR. The thesis’ focus will be 
on the case law and thus the thesis will make use of the legal literature in the field of EU anti-
discrimination law (publications and textbooks) insofar as is necessary for clarifying the 
substance of equality rights and the interpretation of the respective EU legislation. 
Furthermore, in order to fully comprehend the the CJEU’s case-law, the thesis will also cover 
the opinions of the Advocate-Generals of the CJEU (hereinafter AG) clarifying the case-law 
under scrutiny. Thus, the thesis will mainly include analytical and comparative methods for 
research.  
The thesis is divided into two main chapters: the first chapter will introduce the legislation 
regulating entitlements to parental benefits for working parents and the instruments 
safeguarding equal access to these benefits under EU law and national law; the second chapter 
will examine the case law of the CJEU, the ECtHR and national equality bodies concerning 
equal access to parental benefits. The thesis will further compare the CJEU’s case law and the 
ECtHR’s case law to establish whether these courts enable equal level of human rights 
protection for different family models and for parents of different sexes and to verify to which 
extent the adjudication differs. Drawing from the comparison, the main conclusions will be 
presented on the basis of de lege lata as well as proposals will be made for de lege ferenda 
where appropriate.  
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I The framework safeguarding (equal) access to parental benefits in EU 
anti-discrimination law  
 
1.1. Human rights instruments and the principle of equality in EU anti-discrimination 
law  
In order to determine the relevance of human rights protection in EU anti-discrimination law, 
including the right not to be discriminated against and the protection of the rights of the child, 
it is necessary to briefly reflect on the main instruments safeguarding respect for human 
rights. Also, to understand the reach of EU anti-discrimination legislation, the scope of the 
principle of equality and the right not to be discriminated against will shortly be analysed. 
Equality and respect for human rights as some of the values that the EU is founded on are 
listed in Art 2 of the Treaty on European Union
16
 (hereinafter TEU), and combating 
discrimination is set as one of the EU objectives in Art 3 TEU (with express mention of 
promoting equality between men and women). Also, the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women (including the principle of equal pay for men and women) enjoys primary law 
protection under Articles 8 and 157 TFEU. A number of grounds for combating 
discrimination can further be found in Art 10 TFEU, in Art 19 TFEU and in several other EU 
instruments, whereas the scope of non-discrimination clauses varies, depending on how the 
equality guarantee has been framed. 
The main instrument safeguarding respect for human rights in EU law, listing the human 
rights catalogue in more detail, including respect for the principle of equal treatment is the 
EUCFR. Under Art 6(1) TEU the EUCFR has the same legal value as the Treaties
17
, which 
imposes an obligation for broad interpretation of the rights envisaged in the EUCFR, giving 
full effect to the EUCFR. For the purpose of the thesis, the EUCFR contains a number of 
articles safeguarding respect for family life (Art 7 EUCFR), establishing the principle of 
equality (Art 20 EUCFR), aiming to tackle discrimination more generally (Art 21 EUCFR), to 
ensure equality between men and women (Art 23 EUCFR), to safeguard the best interests of 
children (Art 24 EUCFR) and to protect family life (Art 33 EUCFR).  
                                                          
16
 The Treaty on European Union, OJ [2012] C 326/13. 
17
 The term „Treaties“ refers to the EU primary law instruments (i.e. the treaties currently in force in EU law), 
such as the TFEU, theTEU, the EUCFR, the Treaty of Lisbon and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community. 
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The principle of equality can be found in Art 20 EUCFR and a broad non-discrimination 
clause can be found in Art 21 EUCFR, which prohibits any discrimination on any ground and 
provides a non-exhaustive list of specified grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. 
Based on the formulation of Art 21 EUCFR, “judges are given the discretion to extend the list 
according to a set of judicially construed principles, but judicial discretion is shaped by the 
existence of enumerated grounds.”18 Hence, with the kind of non-discrimination clause, the 
courts are in principle free to take into account the changing circumstances and to adjust the 
principle of non-discrimination to these circumstances.
19
 Consequently, the open-ended non-
discrimination clause in Art 21 EUCFR in combination with the values and objectives of the 
EU as listed in Articles 2 and 3 TEU, Articles 8, 10 and 19 TFEU and in combination with the 
importance of human rights protection in EU law might leave the impression that the non-
discrimination argument can be widely invoked to contest legislation differentiating between 
similar groups of people and to construe claims for equal treatment for groups that the 
challenged legislation fails to protect.  
This impression, however, is not entirely accurate as the wider prohibition of discrimination 
under Art 21 EUCFR, as well as the possibility to review instruments in terms of human 
rights protection is limited under Art 51 EUCFR in a considerable way. Namely, Art 51(1) 
EUCFR makes it clear that “the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union are 
only bound by the EUCFR when implementing Union law,” whereas due regard to the 
principle of subsidiarity must be given. Art 51(2) EUCFR specifies further that the EUCFR 
“does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or 
establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties.” The specifications in Art 51 EUCFR make it clear that the scope of applicability of 
the EUCFR is somewhat limited and that Art 21 EUCFR cannot be viewed “as a source of or 
basis for positive action.”20 Furthermore, Art 21 EUCFR “does not create any power to enact 
anti-discrimination laws in the areas [of Member States’ competences], nor does it lay down a 
sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas.”21 
It follows that the EU anti-discrimination legislation still has to be based on specified (Treaty) 
grounds mandating the EU to act within its competences and that the open-ended clause of 
                                                          
18
 S. Fredman “Discrimination Law. Second edition,” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 112. 
19
 Ibid., p. 125. 
20
 P. Craig, G. de Búrca “EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Fifth edition,” New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, p. 397. 
21
 B. Bercusson „European Labour Law. Second edition,“ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 241. 
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non-discrimination in Art 21 EUCFR cannot be invoked to demand favourable action from 
the EU legislator. In that regard, the most relevant ground for legislative action in the field of 
EU anti-discrimination law is Art 19 TFEU, which enables the Council under special 
legislative procedure to enact measures to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Unlike Art 21 EUCFR, 
Art 19 TFEU contains an exhaustive list of specified grounds that can be combated in EU 
anti-discrimination law and the EU legislator is increasingly using Art 19 TFEU to enact 
legislation to protect the specified groups. However, despite the aforementioned, the EUCFR 
can still be invoked to argue for a more human-rights based approach in interpreting the 
legislation and instruments in force (especially for the purposes of adapting the legislation in 
force with the changing circumstances), providing the Union courts with a meaningful 
instrument of safeguarding people’s fundamental rights. As has been explained by M. Bell, 
“locating equal treatment of persons within a context of constitutionally protected principles 
has provided the CJEU with a point of reference when considering how to exercise its 
discretion in interpreting anti-discrimination legislation.”22 Furthermore, what concerns the 
“scope of EU law,” it has, in the CJEU practice, not been so clear-cut what exactly triggers 
the application of EU law (see e.g. the notorious case law concerning EU citizenship
23
). Thus, 
the EUCFR gives the CJEU considerable flexibility to adjudicate in cases in which non-
discrimination arguments are put forward. However, the EUCFR is not the only human rights 
instrument relevant in EU law. 
In addition to the aforementioned non-discrimination clauses and the position of the EUCFR, 
Art 6(3) TEU further stipulates that “fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR /…/ shall 
constitute general principles of the Union law.” By viewing fundamental rights within the 
meaning of the ECHR as general principles of EU law (which, at the same time are also 
deriving from the common national constitutional traditions of the EU Member States 
(hereinafter Member States) as general principles of EU law), the European courts should, in 
principle, take human rights arguments into account whenever they are interpreting or 
                                                          
22
 M. Bell „The principle of equal treatment: widening and deepening“ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds) „The 
Evolution of EU Law. Second edition,“ New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 627. 
23
 E.g. case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010], ECR I-01449, para. 41 to 45; case C-34/09 
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011], ECR I-01177, para. 39 to 42; case C-
434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011], ECR I-03375, para. 45 to 48 etc. 
In all of these cases, inspired by the need to protect human rights, the CJEU found Art 20 TFEU to be applicable 
to the withdrawal of EU citizens’ citizenship and deportation of EU citizens’ family menmbers, although 
according to the facts, the cases did not have a cross-border element necessary to trigger the applicability of EU 
law and notwithstanding that the in the field of withdrawing citizenship and deporting foreign nationals Member 
States have, in essence, exclusive competences.  
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implementing EU law. In that regard, the provisions of the ECHR are important to EU law for 
the following reasons: “1) those provisions of the EUCFR which are based on provisions of 
the ECHR are to have the “same” meaning as the ECHR provisions; 2) the ECHR is one of 
the main sources of inspiration for the general principles of EU law; 3) the provisions of the 
ECHR will eventually become formally binding on the EU, following its accession to the 
ECHR.”24 
Thus, under Art 6(3) TEU, the prohibition of discrimination as set out in Art 14 ECHR is also 
applicable in EU (anti-discrimination) law, presumably influencing the interpretation of Art 
21 EUCFR as Art 14 ECHR was the main source of inspiration
25
 for drawing the non-
discrimination clause in the EUCFR. For this reason, Art 14 ECHR has the same structure as 
Art 21 EUCFR, hence it is also open-textured and can be complemented with novel grounds. 
As S. Fredman has noted, the ECtHR has frequently taken advantage of the outline of Art 14 
ECHR, thus it has been rare for a case to be dismissed on the basis that it did not fall within a 
recognized ground.
26
 Thus, when interpreting rights deriving from the ECHR in conjunction 
with Art 14 ECHR
27, the ECtHR’s flexibility in striking down discriminatory practices should 
be borne in mind. 
Lastly, a variety of non-discrimination clauses can also be found in the main body of EU anti-
discrimination law (i.e. outside the EUCFR), including Art 19 TFEU. These clauses, found in 
the Treaties and specified in the EU secondary legislation contain mainly exhaustive lists of 
grounds protected by EU instruments. With this model, the exhaustive set of grounds cannot 
in principle be extended by the judiciary, but only through legislation.
28
 Nevertheless, it is 
possible for the judiciary to extend the boundaries of the list of protected grounds in cases 
where the delineation of groups protected and groups not falling under the specified grounds 
is not that clear-cut.
29
 The CJEU has in its more progressive case law taken this approach, 
substantiating its decisions with the need to protect human rights and bringing new grounds of 
discrimination in the scope of EU secondary legislation, e.g. by ruling in P. v S. and Cornwall 
County Council that discrimination on ground of sex includes discrimination arising from 
gender reassignment of the person concerned, because “such discrimination is based, 
                                                          
24
 P. Craig, G. de Búrca, op. cit., p. 389.  
25
 Ibid., p. 395, footnote 211.  
26
 S. Fredman, op. cit., p. 125. 
27
 According to its wording, Art 14 ECHR is not a free-standing article, thus it needs to be invoked in conjuntion 
with another article found in the ECHR. 
28
 S. Fredman, op. cit., p. 113. 
29
 Ibid. 
12 
 
essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned” and because “to tolerate 
such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the 
dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to 
safeguard.”30 While in the same decision, the CJEU interpreted the principle of equality as a 
fundamental principle of EU law
31
, “giving the equality principle a much wider scope, akin to 
the US constitutional guarantee”,32 the CJEU has, as will be examined in this thesis, in other 
cases taken a more cautious approach towards extending the scope of application of EU anti-
discrimination law, e.g. in the field of equal access to parental benefits.  
In summary, although human rights protection and the principle of non-discrimination has a 
fundamental status in EU law, EU secondary law in the field of anti-discrimination law is still 
based on specified grounds. Thus, the main body of EU anti-discrimination law (contained in 
EU secondary legislation) is characterised by a piecemeal approach to the prohibition of 
discrimination – protection against discrimination accorded to different groups vulnerable to 
discrimination differs, with some of the groups being accorded less protection than the others 
and with protection against discrimination being enforced in specified spheres only (e.g. in 
labour law, access to services, access to education, housing etc). With the aforementioned in 
mind, it is necessary to clarify that the current thesis (with its focus on equal access to 
parental benefits) is mainly concentrated on issues relating to discrimination on grounds of 
sex in the field of parental benefits of the working population. Thus, the thesis will not 
contain an overview of most of the grounds protected under EU anti-discrimination law, but 
focuses mainly on the instruments aiming to promote equality between the sexes and 
instruments aiming to facilitate equal burden-sharing between the parents and the exercise of 
parental duties.  
 
1.2. The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex in EU anti-discrimination law 
The history of EU sex-equality law (i.e. prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex) 
began as early as in 1957, when Art 119 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community was introduced, requiring that men and women should receive equal pay for 
equal work.
33
 The main focus of the 1957 Treaty, however, was purely economic, its primary 
                                                          
30
 Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996], ECR I-02143, para. 20 to 22. 
31
 Ibid., para. 18. 
32
 S. Fredman, op. cit., p. 115. 
33
 H. Meenan (ed) “Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union. Understanding the Article 13 Directives,” 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 11. 
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objectives including to establish a common market, to promote harmonious development of 
economic activities across the Community, to ensure undistorted competition etc.
34
 With the 
economic objectives of the 1957 Treaty in mind, it is evident, that social concerns were not 
among the primary incentives to advance equality between men and women and to introduce 
the concept of equal pay for men and women. Namely, the principle of equal pay for men and 
women was introduced mainly to deal with the competition concerns of France
35
 which at that 
time had enacted number of provisions favouring workers, including the requirement of equal 
pay for men and women.
36
  
Equality between the sexes and the principle of non-discrimination has gradually evolved 
from serving mainly economic ends to fulfilling the social objectives of the EU. Already in 
Defrenne v SABENA, the CJEU noted that the principle of equal pay for men and women 
(now Art 157 TFEU) pursues a double aim: “(i) first, to avoid a situation in which 
undertakings established in States which have actually implemented the principle of equal pay 
suffer a competitive disadvantage in intra-Community competition as compared with 
undertakings established in States which have not yet eliminated discrimination against 
women workers as regards pay and (ii) secondly, to fulfil social objectives of the Community, 
which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, 
to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and working 
conditions of their peoples.”37 Thus, the CJEU gave a more significant meaning to the 
principle of equal pay for men and women, stretching its scope beyond its original aims and 
paving the way to more comprehensive equal treatment legislation for the sexes. 
The principle of equal treatment for men and women has been given even more prominent 
role after the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty establishing the European Community
38
 (hereinafter the Lisbon Treaty). By giving 
the EUCFR the same value as the Treaties under Art 6(1) TEU, the Lisbon Treaty has made a 
significant impact in the field of social policy, which is also evident by the list of values of the 
EU recognised under Art 2 TEU (including the values of equality, respect for human rights, 
                                                          
34
 P. Craig, G. de Búrca op. cit., p. 6. 
35
 H. Meenan (ed), op. cit., p. 11. 
36
 C. Barnard “EU Employment Law. Fourth edition,” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 6. 
37
 Case C-43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976], ECR 
00455, para. 9 and 10. 
38
 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, OJ [2007] C 306/1. 
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equality between men and women etc.).
39
 Hence, the Treaties in force lay a strong ground for 
pursuing equality between the sexes and deconstructing traditional gender roles, as well as 
pursuing the objective to ensure a high level of human rights protection in the EU. 
In summary, EU sex-equality law has historically been created to address the Member States’ 
competition concerns in the field of labour law, aiming to level the cost of production in 
different Member States. This historical background still somewhat echoes in EU sex-equality 
law, as the most sophisticated body of law is focused on guaranteeing the equality of the sexes 
in the labour market. However, EU sex-equality law has developed far beyond its original 
objectives – it is no longer viewed as serving economic ends, but it is also considered to be a 
substantial part of EU social policy,
40
 stretching to fields other than labour law (e.g. access to 
housing, education, goods and services etc.). 
The main instruments safeguarding equal opportunities for the sexes in working life that relate 
to the object of the current study are Directive 2006/54
41
 (Equal Treatment Directive (recast) 
– hereinafter ETD), Directive 2010/18 (Parental Leave Directive42 – hereinafter PLD) and 
Directive 92/85
43
 (Pregnant Workers Directive – hereinafter PWD). Also, positive 
discrimination measures within the meaning of Art 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 ETD can be 
enacted to enhance the career opportunities of the under-represented sex by introducing 
favourable treatment with a view of ensuring full equality in practice between men and 
women. In addition to the aforementioned instruments, there are several directives in force 
that protect atypical workers (including part-time workers) and some provisions on state 
guaranteed childcare are also enacted. However, since the focus of the thesis is mainly on 
examining equal treatment concerning the entitlements to maternity/parental leave and 
childcare instruments within the meaning of Art 23(2) EUCFR, Art 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 
ETD, the thesis will not cover provisions protecting atypical workers nor will the special state 
guaranteed childcare instruments be analysed. 
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1.2.1 Safeguards under the Equal Treatment Directive  
The first instrument in EU anti-discrimination law, relating to the objective of the thesis, is the 
ETD. The aim of the ETD is to safeguard equal treatment for men and women at workplace in 
a comprehensive manner. Under Art 1(1) ETD, the ETD aims “to ensure the implementation 
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation” in three major fields: “(a) access to employment, including 
promotion, and to vocational training; (b) working conditions, including pay; (c) occupational 
social security schemes” (Art 1(2) ETD). In the aforementioned fields, direct discrimination44 
(including harassment and sexual harassment) and indirect discrimination
45
 based on the 
gender of the employees are strictly prohibited. In that regard, access to parental benefits 
which are capable of influencing working hours/working period
46
, the right to take leave from 
work
47
, the right to use facilities provided by the employer (e.g. nursery places)
48
 etc is 
considered to fall under the sphere of “working conditions,” thus the prohibition of 
discrimination (direct and indirect) applies, in principle, to the granting of parental benefits as 
well. 
Notwithstanding the prohibition of discrimination, positive discrimination within the meaning 
of Art 23(2) EUCFR and Art 157(4) TFEU (i.e. the introduction of measures “with a view of 
ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life providing for 
specific advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a 
vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers”) is 
expressly allowed under Art 3 ETD. Hence, measures in the field of parental benefits that are 
introduced in view of securing full equality in practice between men and women in working 
life should, in principle, fall outside the prohibition of discrimination under the ETD. Such 
measures may lawfully be aimed „to eliminate the causes of women's reduced opportunities 
of access to employment and careers /.../ and to improve the ability of women to compete on 
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the labour market and pursue a career on an equal footing with men.“49 Thus, measures aimed 
to guarantee substantive equality between men and women by giving advantages to one of the 
sexes only are allowed, subject, however, to the test of proportionality „which requires that 
derogations must remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve the aim in view and that the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as 
possible with the requirements of the aim thus pursued.“50 
The main importance of the ETD is that it provides a general means to attack discriminative 
measures introduced by employers from the public or private sector (Art 14 ETD). Also, the 
ETD consolidates some of the most important rights deriving from other EU instruments – 
e.g. the ETD reiterates the entitlement to equal pay for equal work or for work of equal value 
(deriving from the horizontally directly effective Art 157 TFEU, repeated in Art 4 ETD); the 
right to return to a job after maternity leave (Art 15 ETD and Art 10 PWD) etc. Lastly, and 
most importantly, the ETD necessitates the foundation of equality bodies designated to the 
defence and promotion of rights of the employees that are being discriminated against (Art 20 
ETD) and sets the requirement to ensure that real and effective compensations or reparations 
that are dissuasive and proportionate would be introduced in the Member States’ legislation 
(Art 18 ETD).  
In the field of parental benefits, recital 23 of the preamble to the ETD and Art 2(2)(c) ETD 
stipulate that unfavourable treatment of a woman related to pregnancy or maternity constitutes 
direct discrimination on grounds of sex prohibited by the ETD. Also, under Art 9(1)(g) ETD 
“suspending the retention or acquisition of rights during periods of maternity leave or leave 
for family reasons which are granted by law or agreement and are paid by the employer” is 
expressly listed as contrary to the principle of equal treatment; and Art 14 reiterates that 
women are entitled to return to their job or equivalent posts after being on maternity leave.  
The ETD also makes a special provision for paternity or adoption leave, stipulating in Art 16 
ETD that the ETD “is without prejudice to the right of Member States to recognise distinct 
rights to paternity and/or adoption leave. Those Member States which recognise such rights 
shall take the necessary measures to protect working men and women against dismissal due to 
exercising those rights and ensure that, at the end of such leave, they are entitled to return to 
their jobs or to equivalent posts on terms and conditions which are no less favourable to them, 
and to benefit from any improvement in working conditions to which they would have been 
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entitled during their absence.” As the CJEU has noted, however, Art 16 ETD offers only 
limited protection against discrimination on grounds of having taken paternity or adoption 
leave in the Member States that have recognised distinct right to paternity and/or adoption 
leave. Namely, regarding equal treatment under Art 14(1)(c) and Art 16 ETD, the CJEU has 
ruled that “read in conjunction with recital 27 in the preamble to [the ETD], the directive 
preserves the freedom of the Member States to grant or not to grant adoption leave, and the 
conditions for the implementation of such leave, other than dismissal and return to work, are 
outside the scope of that directive.”51 Therefore, following the reasoning of the CJEU, 
introducing differential conditions for obtaining the right to paternity/adoption leave on 
grounds of e.g. family status, does not come within the scope of the ETD.  
According to recital 24 in the preamble to the ETD, the ETD applies without prejudice to the 
PWD and the PLD. As will be analysed further in the second chapter of this thesis, the CJEU 
has, in light of recital 24 in the preamble to the ETD, interpreted the instruments, especially 
the PWD separately from the ETD, sometimes even in cases where there have not been very 
good reasons to subsume the contested measures entirely under separate instruments and thus 
to exclude these measures from the scope of the ETD altogether. 
 
1.2.1.1. Estonian legislation 
Estonia has implemented the ETD by enacting the Gender Equality Act
52
. The Gender 
Equality Act has reiterated the definitions of prohibited discrimination (direct and indirect 
discrimination) and according to § 3(1)(3) of the Gender Equality Act direct discrimination 
based on sex includes also any “less favourable treatment of a person in connection with 
pregnancy and childbirth, parenting, performance of family obligations or other circumstances 
related to gender.” Thus, the Gender Equality Act contains a slightly broader prohibition of 
discrimination in comparison to the ETD as discrimination on grounds of parenting and 
performance of family obligations as circumstances related to gender are also, (in addition to 
discrimination on grounds of pregnancy and childbirth), expressly included in the notion of 
direct discrimination. 
Likewise, as according to the ETD, discrimination on grounds of sex does not occur where the 
legislator has enacted “provisions concerning the special protection of women in connection 
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with pregnancy and childbirth” (§ 5(2)(1) of the Gender Equality Act) and where the 
legislator introduces “specific measures that promote gender equality and give advantages to 
the less-represented sex or reduce gender inequality” (§ 5(5) of the Gender Equality Act). 
Hence, measures enacted to guarantee female workers’ rights within the meaning of the PWD 
and positive discrimination measures within the meaning of Art 23(2) EUCFR, Art 157(4) 
TFEU and Art 3 ETD, are outside the scope of the Gender Equality Act. The Gender Equality 
Act also lists equality bodies that are responsible for monitoring the compliance with the 
Gender Equality Act (§ 15 and § 22 of the Gender Equality Act) and enacts grounds for 
compensation claims (§ 13 of the Gender Equality Act).  
In summary, Estonian legislation complies with the requirements of the ETD in terms of the 
scope and definitions of prohibited discrimination and the excluded fields from the 
prohibition of discrimination. 
 
1.2.2. Entitlements under the Pregnant Workers Directive 
Since only women can become pregnant and only women can suffer from hardships in 
working life relating to pregnancy and childbirth, EU anti-discrimination law has special 
legislation in place safeguarding women’s rights in working life, aiming to reduce women’s 
unequal opportunities relating to pregnancy and childbirth. One of the main instruments 
safeguarding women’s equal treatment during pregnancy and after childbirth is the PWD.53 
The preamble to the PWD considers pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth 
or who are breastfeeding as a specific risk group whose safety and health must be ensured. 
According to Art 1(1) PWD, the directive is aimed to improve the safety and health at work of 
the abovementioned risk group. In addition to regulating the working conditions of pregnant 
workers, workers who have recently given birth and breastfeeding workers, the PWD gives 
women the entitlement to a continuous period of maternity leave of at least 14 weeks before 
and/or after childbirth (Art 8 PWD). Under Art 8(2) PWD maternity leave includes 
compulsory maternity leave of at least 2 weeks before and/or after childbirth. During 
maternity leave, the workers are protected from dismissal (Art 10 PWD). As an important 
guarantee for pregnant workers/working mothers, states have the obligation to provide these 
workers minimum income during maternity leave, equivalent at least to that which the worker 
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concerned would receive in the event of a break in her activities on grounds connected with 
her state of health (Art 11(3) PWD).  
The CJEU has ruled in numerous cases that the aim of maternity leave is twofold. According 
to the CJEU “maternity leave of the kind provided for in [the PWD], is intended, first, to 
protect a woman's biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, to protect the 
special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy 
and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens 
which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of employment.”54 Thus, maternity leave is 
granted mainly for health-related reasons, but also to reinforce the social role of being a 
mother (and to enable the mother to breastfeed her child). To ensure that this dual aim is 
achieved, women are accorded high level of protection during maternity leave which includes 
protection against dismissal on grounds of pregnancy or childbirth and also the obligation to 
maintain adequate pay during their absence from work.  
As clarified in the practice of the CJEU, pregnancy in terms of the PWD implies that only 
women that are de facto pregnant can rely on the PWD, thus the PWD does not protect 
against discrimination on grounds that a woman is undergoing IVF treatment with a view of 
becoming pregnant,
55
 however the situation is covered by the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sex under the ETD.
56
 Also, the CJEU has noted that the entitlement to maternity 
leave under the PWD is granted only to women that themselves have been pregnant
57
, thus 
motherhood in terms of the PWD is, according to the interpretation of the CJEU, construed 
strictly on the basis of biological criteria. Based on the former case law, the PWD does not 
offer protection to mothering as a social role only (regardless of the dual aim of maternity 
leave, part of which is related to the protection of a mother-child relationship), neither does 
the protection under the PWD extend to women solely on breastfeeding grounds, if the 
women themselves have not been pregnant. The former case law of the CJEU has significance 
especially in matters concerning the intended parents’ claims to maternity leave. 
It is also noteworthy that at the EU level, further amendments were proposed to the PWD in 
2008, including increasing the minimum length of maternity leave from 14 to 18 weeks and 
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establishing the principle of full pay during maternity leave.
58
 The underpinning rationale was 
to enable the mother to breastfeed for a longer period than possible under the current 
legislation, especially as part of the maternity leave (6 weeks) was designed to be mandatorily 
granted after childbirth.
59
 While the amendments did not gain enough support and are not 
reflected in the PWD, it can be borne in mind that there still might be incentives to review the 
PWD in the future.  
 
1.2.2.1. Estonian legislation 
Estonian legislation corresponding to Art 8 and Art 11 of the PWD can be found in the 
Employment Contracts Act
60
 (provisions on the entitlement to maternity leave) and the Health 
Insurance Act
61
 (provisions on the remuneration during maternity leave). According to 
§ 59(1) of the Employment Contracts Act, a woman has the right to pregnancy and maternity 
leave of 140 calendar days. According to § 54(1)(4) of the Health Insurance Act, in case of 
pregnancy and maternity leave, workers are entitled to a benefit that is equal to their average 
income per calendar day. Under § 58(1) of the Health Insurance Act “a pregnant woman has 
the right to receive maternity benefit on the basis of a certificate for maternity leave for 140 
calendar days if her pregnancy and maternity leave commences at least 30 calendar days 
before the estimated date of delivery as determined by a doctor or midwife.” Hence, under the 
regulation women are stimulated to use part of their maternity leave during pregnancy and a 
minimum of 30 calendar days can be viewed as aiming to protect women’s health during their 
pregnancy. Under the current legislation, women are also encouraged to use maternity leave 
in full
62
, but that does not mean that maternity leave should be viewed as a mandatory leave. 
In that regard, Estonian Chancellor of Justice came to the conclusion that the legislation sets 
the maximum period of non-transferable maternity leave which cannot be viewed as a 
mandatory leave but can be waived if the woman chooses to do so.
63
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As to the purpose of maternity leave, the Estonian equality bodies have reiterated the position 
of the CJEU, listing health-related reasons as the primary reason for maternity leave
64
 but also 
the aim to protect the special (emotional) bond between the mother and the child.
65
 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the entire duration of maternity leave in Estonia cannot 
be viewed as aiming to protect mainly women’s biological condition: namely, as a large part 
of maternity leave (70-110 days) could be taken after childbirth, it could be argued that some 
of the leave is aimed to simply facilitate childcare, the more so as the Estonian maternity 
leave scheme was enforced during the time where no other remunerated parental leave 
benefits were available.
66
 The purpose of the Estonian maternity leave can thus be contested 
which could be relevant for substantiating fathers’ claims for equal access to a part of the 
maternity leave.  
In summary, Estonian legislation corresponds to the PWD as to the workers’ entitlement to 
maternity leave, its remuneration and related safeguards, whereas the provisions on maternity 
leave in the Employment Contracts Act and the Health Insurance Act (as to the duration of 
maternity leave and the maintenance of full income during maternity leave) enable a 
considerably higher standard of protection in comparison to the minimum standard of 
protection required by Art 8 and Art 11 of the PWD. Similarly to the CJEU’s interpretation of 
the purpose of maternity leave under the PWD, Estonian legislation on maternity leave 
follows the same rationale as to the aim of maternity leave.  
 
1.2.3. Entitlements under the Parental Leave Directive 
The third instrument relevant for the purpose of the thesis in the field of parental benefits is 
the PLD. The PLD is designed to be an instrument safeguarding equal opportunities for 
parents of both sexes to take leave in order to care for their child(ren) on equal footing. Thus, 
parental leave under the PLD is granted to parents in their capacity of a parent, i.e. on grounds 
unrelated to sex and should be viewed as a measure promoting substantive equality for the 
sexes. In that regard, AG Kokott has noted that the “objective of the [PLD] is to foster 
equality between men and women in the assumption of family responsibilities and, 
specifically, to encourage men to take parental leave. Consequently, both parents — and in 
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particular men — should have the opportunity to be involved in the upbringing of their 
children without suffering occupational disadvantages or finding themselves obliged to give 
up work.”67 
Under Clause 2(1) PLD men and women workers are entitled to an individual right to parental 
leave on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child to take care of that child. According to 
Clause 2(2) PLD, parental leave shall be granted for at least a period of four months and, to 
promote equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women, should, in 
principle, be provided on a non-transferable basis. In accordance with the aim of the PLD, 
Clause 2(2) PLD should be interpreted that where the leave is granted on a transferable basis, 
at least one of these four months should be non-transferable to encourage the take up of leave 
by both parents.
68
 In accordance with the aim of the PLD (to enable both parents to be 
involved in childrearing matters), men’s access to parental leave should, in particular, be 
facilitated.  
As has been established by the CJEU, parental leave under the PLD should be distinguished 
from maternity leave and consequently “each parent is entitled to parental leave of at least 
[now four months’] duration and that this may not be reduced when it is interrupted by 
another period of leave which pursues a purpose different from that of parental leave, such as 
maternity leave.”69 Thus, parental leave can be interrupted by maternity leave (or any other 
leave) without it reducing the period of parental leave as the PLD grants an individual right to 
at least four months parental leave. 
It is also noteworthy, that according to the clarifications of the CJEU, the right to parental 
leave is conferred solely on the parents in their capacity as workers, and not to the child and 
that Art 24 EUCFR cannot call that finding in question.
70
 Namely, while under Art 24 
EUCFR, children have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-
being, it “does not mean that children have to be acknowledged as having an individual right 
to see their parents obtain parental leave. It is sufficient for such a right to be conferred on the 
parents themselves. It is they who have both the right and the duty to bring up their children 
and who, for that purpose, can decide on how best to perform their parental responsibilities, in 
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choosing whether or not to have recourse to parental leave.”71 Thus, under the current EU 
legislation, parental leave is largely untied from the considerations of safeguarding the child’s 
right to have personal contact with its parents during the time following its birth, but is 
introduced mainly as an instrument safeguarding substantive equality of the sexes in 
childrearing matters. 
In contrast to the level of protection during maternity leave under the PWD, Member States 
are left considerable discretion in introducing more detailed conditions of access to parental 
leave under Clause 3, provided that the minimum guarantees deriving from the PLD are 
respected. Furthermore, Member States are not obliged to provide income or social security 
during parental leave under the PLD. Matters regarding social security and income are left for 
the consideration and determination of the Member States, taking into account respectively (i) 
the importance of the continuity of the entitlements to social security cover under the different 
schemes, in particular health care and (ii) the role of income – among other factors – in the 
take-up of parental leave (Clause 5(5) PLD). Nevertheless, workers have the right to return to 
the same job after parental leave or, if that is not possible, to an equivalent or similar job 
consistent with their employment contract or employment relationship (Clause 5(1) PLD). 
Hence, it can be noted, that taking up (sex-neutral) parental leave can be associated with less 
guarantees deriving from the PLD (in terms of maintenance of income during parental leave 
and conditions for eligibility) in comparison with the minimum guarantees accorded to 
maternity leave under the PWD. Thus, Member States have a considerable margin of 
appreciation in deciding the extent of their family friendly policies under the PLD. As a 
consequence, Member States’ legislation on parental leave varies significantly to the 
detriment of mostly fathers that, as opposed to mothers, have no mandatory paternity leave 
under EU legislation made available for them.  
 
1.2.3.1. Estonian legislation  
Provisions on parental leave can be found in the Employment Contracts Act and the Parental 
Benefit Act
72
 (the latter concerning mainly the maintenance of income during parental leave). 
According to § 62(1) of the Employment Contracts Act a mother or a father has the right to 
parental leave until his or her child reaches the age of three years. Parental leave may be used 
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in one part or in several parts every year (§ 62(2) of the Employment Contracts Act). 
Employees are entitled to remuneration in accordance with the Parental Benefit Act. 
According to § 3(1) of the Parental Benefit Act, the amount of the benefit per calendar month 
shall be calculated on the basis of the average income of the applicant for the benefit per 
calendar month. Under § 3(3) of the Parental Benefit Act, the amount of the benefit per 
calendar month shall be 100 per cent of the average income per calendar month. However, the 
remuneration is subject to specified minimum and maximum limits. Parental benefit is 
granted for the period of 435 days as of the date on which the right to receive the benefit 
arises (§ 4(4) of the Parental Benefit Act). 
According to § 2(2) of the Parental Benefit Act a parent, adoptive parent, step-parent, 
guardian or caregiver raising a child with respect to whom a written foster care contract has 
been entered into has the right to receive the benefit. Under the same paragraph, part of the 
parental leave is reserved to the mother of the child; namely the mother of the child who is 
raising the child has the right to receive the benefit before the child attains seventy days of 
age. There are no similar provisions, though, for the father of the child. The Minister of Social 
Affairs has noted that the provisions on maternity leave and parental leave should be viewed 
integrally, as these regulations coherently constitute the main social protection scheme aiming 
to facilitate childcare following the birth of the child.
73
 Thus, it can be assumed that by 
reserving a part of parental leave to women during the time following childbirth, the 
legislation aims to ensure that women that were not entitled to maternity leave would 
nevertheless be granted some time to recover after childbirth and hence 70 days could be 
viewed as part of mandatory protection for women following childbirth. However, the 
necessity of granting 70 days of non-transferable parental leave could still be contested.
74
  
In summary, Estonian legislation on parental leave is more generous (as to the length of the 
parental leave and the remuneration scheme) than the minimum standard required under the 
PLD. However, it can be noted that Estonian legislation on parental leave is inclined towards 
reinforcing the ties between the mother and the child, as mothers are entitled to a long 
maternity leave prior to gaining access to parental leave – parental leave can be taken by the 
parents only after the maternity leave comes to an end (§ 2(4) of the Parental Benefit Act) and 
in case the mother waives a part of her maternity leave, the father is not entitled to a full 
remuneration during the first 70 days of leave (§ 3(51) of the Parental Benefit Act). 
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Furthermore, mothers that did not qualify for maternity leave (i.e. non-working mothers), 
have been granted non-transferable right to use some of the parental leave themselves (§ 2(2) 
of the Parental Benefit Act). As such, the legislation does not give incentives to the fathers to 
focus on their parenting tasks from the early stages of their children’s development.  
Furthermore, the Parental Benefit Act does not currently promote equal opportunities and 
substantive equality between men and women in the best possible way. Namely, the PLD 
requires that each of the parents should be entitled to four months of preferably non-
transferable parental leave (Clause 2(2) PLD). In Estonia, however, although a father may 
choose to stay on parental leave (provisions on parental leave and the remuneration scheme 
under the Parental Benefit Act are sex-neutral), the initial period of parental leave is reserved 
for biological mothers and there is no non-transferable parental leave granted for biological 
fathers under the Parental Benefit Act.  
Instead, according to the Estonian parental benefits schemes, fathers may choose to stay on 
paternity leave under § 60 of the Employment Contracts Act (a parallel entitlement to parental 
leave scheme) according to which “a father has the right to receive total of ten working days 
of paternity leave during the two months before the estimated date of birth determined by a 
doctor or midwife and during the two months after the birth of the child.” During paternity 
leave, fathers are entitled to remuneration on the basis of their average wages which cannot 
exceed the ceiling of three times the average gross monthly salary in Estonia. However, 
despite receiving remuneration for paternity leave and despite the relatively short duration of 
paternity leave, fathers in Estonia have not actively taken-up paternity leave – in 2013, only 
38,8% of fathers chose to stay on paternity leave.
75
 The main reason for the fathers’ relatively 
low involvement in childcare matters (including low usage of paternity leave) can be 
explained by the fathers’ attitudes towards childrearing matters that are influenced by 
traditional perception of roles in the family. In that regard, the system in force, whereby 
fathers may stay on paternity leave that fully coincides with the period of maternity leave, and 
whereby fathers have no non-transferable parental leave period under the Parental Benefit 
Act, does not meaningfully promote equal burden-sharing between the two parents.  
Thus, the statement in the Eurydice and Eurostat 2014 report on childcare that “adequately 
compensated childcare leave largely comprising maternity leave commonly results in a gender 
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imbalance in the provision of care,”76 is equally true for Estonia as e.g. in 2012 only less than 
6% of fathers chose to stay on parental leave
77
 and in 2013 the percentage of fathers staying 
on parental leave had dropped to 1,7%
78
 and the same declining trend can be noted in respect 
of paternity leave as well
79
. The gender imbalance issue concerning the take-up of childcare 
obligations in Estonia has also been brought out in the report by the Estonian Ministry of 
Social Affairs on gender equality.
80
 Namely, it has been noted in the report that in practice 
fathers are discouraged to balance their obligations at work with their childcare obligations 
because the employers are used to perceiving fathers’ parental role as subsidiary to that of the 
role of mothers and also fathers’ own perception of their parental role coincides with the 
aforementioned attitude.
81
  
In countries that are devoted to promoting substantive gender equality in the take-up of 
parental leave, the entitlements to parental leave differ significantly from Estonian legislation. 
E.g. in Sweden “a certain number of weeks is reserved for each parent. In Iceland and 
Norway, parental leave is divided into three parts: three months for each parent and three 
months’ joint entitlement. In Germany and Austria, parental benefits are extended if both 
parents take care of a child.”82 In these countries, fathers are also more willing to take up 
parental leave as e.g. in Sweden already in 2003 fathers’ participation in parental leave 
schemes extended to 67%.
83
 
Hence, although in Estonia, the entitlement to parental leave exceeds the minimum period 
required under the PLD and is adequately remunerated, the regulation does not comply with 
the aim of ensuring substantive equality for men and women by promoting more equal 
burden-sharing of childcare obligations. The latter aim could be achieved if parental leave 
would be divided into non-transferable periods of parental leave for each of the parents (of 
four months), as suggested under Clause 2(2) PLD, or, in case of introducing transferable 
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parental leave scheme, by granting a period of non-transferable parental leave (with the 
minimum duration of one of the four months) to fathers only.  
By failing to take meaningful action towards enforcing the parental role of fathers, the 
legislation in force is liable for perpetuating traditional views on parenting which in turn leads 
to further gender imbalance in the labour market. As has been noted by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs in its report on gender equality, “ideal worker” in the labour market is currently 
perceived as an individual who works full hours (being also capable of working overtime and 
during the week-ends, whenever necessary) and who does not have obligations unrelated to 
work during his/her time off work.
84
 Based on the former description, it is clear that in a 
situation where women bear most of the childcare obligations, the “ideal worker” is mainly 
perceived as a male worker.
85
 Thus, gender imbalance in childcare obligations within families 
will evidently further impede women’s participation in the labour market and will create the 
so-called “maternal wall” in advancing towards higher-ranking positions, a phenomenon very 
common to the Estonian labour market. 
Hence, Estonian legislation on parental leave needs to be amended in order to fully comply 
with the aim of the PLD, namely the aim of promoting substantive equality between men and 
women and reconciliation of professional, private and family life. The aim could easily be 
achieved, if the parental leave scheme would stimulate fathers to take up more parental 
obligations, e.g. by granting a four months’ period of non-transferable parental leave to 
fathers, as suggested under Clause 2(2) PLD.   
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II A comparison of the case law of the CJEU and the EctHR on granting 
parental benefits  
 
The first chapter of the thesis presented a brief overview of the main instruments applicable to 
parental benefits relating to childcare and the instruments safeguarding equal access to these 
benefits both at the EU and national level. Also, the first chapter listed the main instruments 
necessitating human rights protection in EU law and reflected on their significance in EU law.  
As can be concluded from the first chapter, the current EU legislation in the field of parental 
benefits distinguishes between maternity/paternity, parental leave and positive discrimination 
measures introduced to facilitate childcare or enacted taking into account childrearing 
concerns, aiming to ensure substantive equality for the sexes. Under the current EU 
legislation, the ETD covers discrimination in the field of equal access to parental benefits, 
however, measures enacted under the PWD, under the PLD and within the meaning of Art 
23(2) EUCFR, 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 ETD ought to be examined separately, giving special 
regard to their purpose. Also, what concerns paternity/adoption leave, there are no provisions 
obliging the Member States to make paternity/adoption leave available for workers – the 
scope of EU anti-discrimination legislation in this field is thus limited.  
Having in mind the main instruments safeguarding access to parental benefits in EU anti-
discrimination law, the second chapter of the thesis will further focus on the case law of the 
CJEU in the field of equal access to parental benefits for parents of different sexes and for 
atypical families (i.e. families that have resorted to surrogacy). The second chapter will 
analyse the cases brought before the CJEU, reflect on the argumentation of the CJEU and will 
assess to what extent the CJEU has taken into account human rights arguments, e.g. equality 
rights, the rights of the child and the protection of family life. Further, the case law of the 
CJEU will be compared to that of the ECtHR concerning the access to parental benefits for 
fathers and parents in atypical families to verify whether the courts have interpreted the 
prohibition of discrimination in the same manner and whether the level of human rights 
protection accorded by the courts coincides in that field. In the end of the chapter, Estonian 
scarce practice in the field of equal access to parental benefits will be analysed.  
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2.1. Fathers’ access to parental benefits under the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR 
2.1.1. Fathers’ access to parental benefits under the case law of the CJEU 
 
According to Art 23 EUCFR “equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, 
including employment, work and pay.“ The principle of equality for the sexes is further 
accentuated in Art 14 ETD, and, more specifically in the field of working conditions 
(including access to parental benefits) in Art 14(1)(c) ETD. 
In a number of cases, the CJEU has been challenged with the question of fathers’ equal access 
to parental/maternity/adoption leave or parental benefits introduced as positive discrimination 
measures. Namely, men that have taken greater responsibility for nurturing their children have 
faced several legislative obstacles which do not support taking a more active role in their 
families. In most Member States fathers do not receive adequate compensation for paternity 
leave
86
 and over time countries have introduced measures relating to childcare which the 
fathers have not been entitled to. In some of the cases, these measures have been designed to 
offset disadvantages that women as the primary caretakers in the families have been subjected 
to. In others, these measures have been enacted based on the traditional perception of roles in 
the family and hence disregarding the principle of equality between the sexes. In the 
following section, it will be analysed how the CJEU has ruled on the cases concerning 
fathers’ entitlements to parental benefits. 
There have been several cases in which fathers that have taken primary responsibility of 
nurturing their children following the birth of their children have not been granted paid leave 
(comparable to that of maternity leave) to facilitate taking care of their children. As paternity 
leave is mainly not adequately compensated
87
, fathers have strong incentives to argue that 
paid maternity leave extending the period necessary for the protection of a woman’s 
biological condition after childbirth should equally be granted to men and women, especially 
so if the mother of the child has decided not to use maternity leave in full. Similarly, it could 
be argued that Member States which have introduced paid sex-neutral adoption leave (i.e. 
leave introduced to parents in their capacity as parents), are required to provide leave on the 
same conditions and for the same remuneration for biological fathers as well. 
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Among the first cases concerning equal treatment of men in the field of parental benefits to 
have reached the CJEU, was Commission v Italy,
88
 a case in which the Commission aimed to 
strike down Italian legislation concerning adoption leave, alleging that the legislation was 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment for men and women under [now Art 14(1)(c) of 
the ETD]. Namely, the legislation introduced differential treatment for men and women as it 
foresaw compulsory adoption leave of three months for women only, excluding men from 
being entitled to such a benefit.
89
 The Commission considered that the prohibition of 
discrimination under the [now ETD] was” intentionally broad and comprehensive in scope” 
and that the disputed law “discriminated against workers on grounds of adoption” amounting 
to discrimination in the field of working conditions.
90
  
However, the CJEU did not agree with the Commission but held that the distinction between 
men and women regarding their differential entitlements to adoption leave “is justified /…/ by 
the legitimate concern to assimilate as far as possible the conditions of entry of the child into 
the adoptive family to those of the arrival of a newborn child in the family during the very 
delicate initial period.”91 Thus, following this highly disputable argumentation, the CJEU 
found that the differential treatment between men and women did not amount to 
discrimination on grounds of sex under the now Art 14(1)(c) ETD in the field of working 
conditions. It is noteworthy that AG Rozès came to the opposite conclusion, finding that 
contrarily to maternity leave which is primarily intended to protect a woman’s physical 
condition after childbirth, “leave after adoption benefits the child above all in so far as it is 
intended to foster the emotional ties necessary to settle the child in the family adopting it /…/ 
and must be interpreted in the predominant interests of the child.”92 Since AG Rozès did not 
find that expanding paid three-months’ compulsory maternity leave to adoptive mothers but 
not to adoptive fathers was justified under special circumstances (such as pregnancy and 
childbirth), she concluded that the provision did come within the scope of the [now ETD] and 
was discriminatory in the field of working conditions.
93
  
In that regard, AG Rozès’ argumentation is far more sound, as it is difficult to see why 
mothers and fathers could not equally fulfil their social role as parents efficiently and in the 
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best interests of the child, as there is no evidence to support the finding that during „the very 
delicate initial period“ only mothers are capable of assimilating the adoptive child into his/her 
new family. Concerning adoption leave, the parents are thus similarly situated as the 
underpinning rationale of granting adoption leave is that the child would receive parental care, 
which can be equally provided by both of the parents in the best interests of the child and 
there are no differences between the sexes in that regard that would justify their differential 
treatment. Thus, as can be noted, in its earliest case law concerning fathers’ entitlements, the 
CJEU reinforced traditional gender roles in the families by taking a very biased attitude 
towards social parental roles. 
The next case concerning the division of parental roles within a family and more specifically, 
a case concerning a father’s entitlement to maternity leave was Hofmann.94 In Hofmann, the 
plaintiff obtained from his employer unpaid leave of absence in the period between the expiry 
of the mother's statutory period of convalescence and the day on which the child reached the 
age of six months while the mother of the child returned to work.
95
 The father of the child 
claimed that it was contrary to the principle of equal treatment under the current Art 1, Art 
14(1)(c) and recital (24) of the preamble to the ETD that the legislation provided for paid 
maternity leave up to six months after childbirth only to working mothers while excluding 
working fathers from being entitled to such a benefit. The father argued that “there was no 
clear reason for treating fathers and mothers differently, that there was no ground specifically 
identifiable with sex which argued in favour of the mother's role being pre-eminent in caring 
for the child, provided that it enjoyed the permanent presence of a person to whom it might 
relate and that the aim [of maternity leave] /…/ was equally attained if the child was brought 
up by the father.”96 The father also claimed that “maternity leave is a social benefit from the 
State which is intended to assist in the bringing up of the child” and that it also “serves as a 
measure of family policy, affording a period of leave intended to enable children to be cared 
for.”97 Thus, the father insisted that maternity leave was not entirely excluded from the 
scrutiny of its correspondence with the principle of equal treatment for men and women under 
the now Art 14 ETD, as it does not aim only to protect the woman’s biological condition after 
                                                          
94
 Case C-184/83 Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984], ECR 03047. 
95
 Case 184/83, op. cit., p. 03050. 
96
 Ibid., p. 03052. 
97
 Ibid., p. 03053 and 03054. 
32 
 
childbirth, but also to reinforce a woman’s social role as a mother,98 at least inasmuch what 
concerns the period exceeding statutory protection of women after childbirth.  
The CJEU, however, did not agree with the father’s claims and stated that the [now ETD] “is 
not designed to settle questions concerned with the organization of the family, or to alter the 
division of responsibility between parents.”99 The CJEU continued that in its view it was 
“legitimate to ensure the protection of a woman's biological condition during pregnancy and 
thereafter until such time as her physiological and mental functions have returned to normal 
after childbirth; and secondly, it is legitimate to protect the special relationship between a 
woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing 
that relationship from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the 
simultaneous pursuit of employment.”100 In that regard, the CJEU found that “such leave may 
legitimately be reserved to the mother to the exclusion of any other person, in view of the fact 
that it is only the mother who may find herself subject to undesirable pressures to return to 
work prematurely.”101 The CJEU thus came to the conclusion that the now ETD does not 
necessitate that fathers would equally be granted paid leave under the same conditions as 
applicable to maternity leave and that maternity leave serves to protect women only (i.e. their 
physical condition and their social role as a mother), regardless of whether maternity leave is 
divided into statutory/voluntary leave periods and regardless of its duration. 
The opinion of AG Darmon sheds more light on the CJEU reasoning. Namely, AG Darmon 
brings out more clearly what, in his view, necessitates the special protection of women. AG 
Darmon is of the view that the objective considerations for mandatory maternity leave is 
“connected with a woman's special biological make-up”102 and that the possibility to take 
optional maternity leave is justified by the fact that mothers are “confronted by extra burdens 
at the end of the eight-week of leave, since the upkeep of the household and the resumption of 
employment are supplemented by the intensive care which an infant requires, especially 
during the early months. Moreover, that threefold burden is all the more difficult for the 
mother to bear because her state of health is, generally speaking, still precarious, which helps 
to explain the cases in which employment is given up.”103 Thus, AG Darmon saw additional 
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maternity leave (i.e. optional maternity leave after the compulsory maternity leave) as not a 
measure aimed to facilitate childcare as such (in which case safeguarding the best interests of 
the child would be the underpinning rationale) but prominently as a preventive measure aimed 
to protect women’s delicate health condition after childbirth.  
However, the rationale of protecting women’s health during the optional maternity leave 
(which in case of Hofmann, could be up to four months after the compulsory leave of two 
months) does not seem as self-evident as the CJEU claimed it was and could be disputed. 
While it can be accepted that maternity leave is granted to protect women’s health due to 
women’s special biological functions related to pregnancy and childbirth (a position that is 
also evident under the preamble to the PWD), it can be still argued that maternity leaves, 
especially those with long duration are not only granted for health-related reasons. In that 
regard, AG Kokott, reiterating the case law of the CJEU, argued in C.D. v S.T.
104
 that 
maternity leave does not only protect a woman’s physical condition during pregnancy and 
after childbirth, but is partly intended to “protect the special relationship between a woman 
and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, a position which is also 
consistent with Articles 24(3) and 7 of the EUCFR.”105 Thus, in AG Kokott’s view, as 
maternity leave is, in part, granted to safeguard the children’s personal contact with his/her 
parents and to protect the family as a unit, it is possible to divide maternity leave according to 
the twofold purposes of maternity leave.
106
  
Thus, provided that maternity leave pursues several objectives, not all of them relating to the 
protection of women’s health but also aimed to facilitate adapting to a new parental role (as a 
social role, performed in the best interest of the child), it could also be argued that maternity 
leave period exceeding the period granted to protect women’s health, could equally be 
claimed by both of the parents (including fathers). It is difficult to see why only women need 
special protection to adapt to their social role as a mother, but not men, especially so if a part 
of maternity leave under national legislation is detached from health-related concerns (e.g. by 
introducing part of maternity leave as an optional leave) and serves mainly the best interests 
of the child, namely facilitating the child’s integration into its family. Thus, it could as well be 
claimed, especially in case of long maternity leaves, that reserving maternity leave in full only 
to mothers, that is granted, in part, to facilitate the upbringing of the child, does not conform 
with the principle of equal treatment for men and women under Art 14(1)(c) ETD as there are 
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no weighty reasons to treat mothers and fathers that have assumed their parental roles 
differently. In that regard, it could be argued that the longer the maternity leave is provided 
(as a special protection accorded only to women), the weightier reasons, necessitating the 
exclusion of fathers, should be brought to find such measures acceptable. Furthermore, the 
longer the maternity leave is provided, the stricter the standard of scrutiny under the ETD 
should be as the ETD aims, according to recital (2) of the preamble to the ETD to advance not 
only formal, but also substantive equality between the sexes. 
Regarding the substantive equality argument, by taking the position uttered in Hofmann that 
the ETD is not designed to alter the roles in a family the CJEU did not respect the aim of the 
ETD, namely the aim of guaranteeing substantive equality between the sexes. Hence, it could 
further be argued, as C. Barnard has noted, that creating an artificial distinction between the 
spheres of work and family life “further prejudices the many women who are not ‘well-
assimilated’ to the male norm and denies them de facto equality.”107 Thus, it would be 
desirable if the CJEU in its cases concerning equal access to maternity leave, would pay more 
respect to the principle of equality between the sexes within the meaning of Art 14(1)(c) ETD, 
the more so as the principle of equality has been given the status of a fundamental principle in 
EU law within the meaning of Art 20 EUCFR and with equality of the sexes being expressly 
guaranteed under Art 23 EUCFR  In that regard, however, the views if the CJEU concerning 
maternity leave, have not changed much, as can be seen from its recent case law.  
The issue of equal treatment for men and women concerning maternity leave was again 
recently brought before the CJEU. In Montull
108
 a father that took care of the couple’s baby 
after its birth claimed that he was entitled to maternity leave that exceeded the 6 weeks of 
compulsory maternity leave reserved for women. Under the contested legislation, the mother 
of the child could transfer the right to maternity leave to the father of the child in case both of 
the parents were employed, thus, the father of the child enjoyed a derivative right from the 
mother of the child.
109
 As the mother of the child was a self-employed person, the father of 
the child was not granted maternity leave.
110
 In the national proceedings the plaintiff claimed 
that the refusal by the authorities to grant him the maternity benefit was not in accordance 
with the principle of equal treatment for the sexes in the field of working conditions as it 
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introduced differential treatment between male and female workers concerning their 
entitlements to paid maternity leave; furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the contested 
legislation introduced differential treatment between biological fathers and adoptive fathers as 
in case of adoption or fostering the child, both of the parents enjoyed a primary right to 
maternity leave.
111
  
The CJEU, however, found that the measure did not encroach on fathers’ rights, but that the 
Member States were under now recital (24) of the preamble to the ETD entitled to introduce 
measures in conformity with the PWD that aim to protect women’s biological condition 
before and after childbirth. The CJEU found that the contested legislation was thus not 
covered by the ETD and that there was no prohibition to grant female workers (and not male 
workers) special benefits within the meaning of the PWD.
112
 What concerns the plaintiff’s 
second claim – the claim that the contested legislation discriminated unlawfully between 
biological fathers and adoptive fathers – the CJEU held that this claim did not come within 
the scope of EU law and refrained from taking a stand on this point as at the time of the facts 
in the proceedings, there was no prohibition in EU law of discrimination between the adoptive 
father and biological father in relation to maternity leave.
113
 
The conclusion of the CJEU in Montull as regards equal treatment for the sexes under Art 
14(1)(c) ETD can be contradicted. Namely, neither AG Wathelet in his opinion
114
 nor the 
Commission in its written observations shared the view of the CJEU. The Commission in its 
observations found that where the contested legislation “permits the father to benefit from a 
further period of 10 weeks, it detaches that period from the biological fact of maternity. /…/ 
that period is construed as a period for giving care and attention to the child to which both 
employed mothers and fathers are entitled.”115 Therefore, the Commission took the view that 
the now ETD was applicable to the voluntary leave period and that differential treatment for 
men and women on this point was not allowed.
116
 AG Wathelet took the same view, by 
stating that “unlike the /…/ leave immediately following the birth which, with a view to 
protecting her biological condition, the mother is required to take, the 10 weeks’ leave at issue 
in the main proceedings cannot fall within the scope of [now recital (24) of the preamble to 
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the ETD]. By providing that the mother may, at the beginning of the maternity leave, elect, 
after the first 6 weeks, for the father to take a designated and continuous part of the 
subsequent 10-week period of leave, the Spanish legislature detached those 10 weeks of leave 
from the mother’s biological condition and, consequently, from the purpose of [now recital 
(24) of the preamble to the ETD].”117 Thus, AG Wathelet argues that the “leave in the present 
case is accorded to workers solely in their capacity as parents of the child”118 and that 
differential treatment for men and women was not justified.  
The opinion of AG Wathelet is far more convincing concerning the period of optional 
maternity leave going beyond the protection of a woman’s biological condition especially in 
the case where the leave is under the contested legislation, in principle, made available to both 
parents. Namely, as the measure could be applied to fathers, mothers and adoptive parents 
from both sexes, it strongly assumes that leave beyond the mandatory (health-related) 
maternity leave was not granted on sex-specific grounds and there was no reason to classify 
the measure as a measure aimed to grant special protection to women within the meaning of 
the PWD. Furthermore, considering parenting as a social function, there is no reason to 
suggest that men and women could not provide the same care in the best interests of their 
child in their capacity as parents, therefore it is not justified nor in accordance with the equal 
treatment principle to make a distinction between their entitlements.  
While the CJEU’s precautious approach towards expanding the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women under the ETD to maternity leave enacted in accordance with the PWD, 
can be understood to some extent, it does not mean that the conditions of maternity leave 
should altogether be immune from scrutiny and that the ETD has no reach as it comes to 
maternity leave. Maternity leave should escape the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women in the field of working conditions inasmuch as it fulfils the aim of the PWD – the 
protection of women’s biological condition and health, and, deriving from the case-law of the 
CJEU, also to a presumably far lesser extent the delicate relationship between the mother and 
her newborn. While it is difficult to establish when exactly maternity leave in fact becomes 
leave granted for parents solely in their capacity as parents, there are some indications in the 
PWD in that regard. Namely, Art 8(2) PWD clearly signals that 2 weeks of compulsory 
maternity leave should be viewed as the absolute minimum period of women’s health 
protection and that the period necessary for recovery should optionally extend up to 14 weeks 
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(without determining the period of leave that should be taken before or after childbirth). 
However, logically, if maternity leave is designed to protect women’s condition before and 
after childbirth, it is clear that some of the 14 weeks should be viewed as aiming to protect 
women’s health during pregnancy as well and not all of the 14 weeks of maternity leave 
should be granted after the birth of the child. In that regard, the amendment proposals to the 
PWD were more indicative, as 6 weeks of maternity leave was introduced as the period of 
leave that would have to be taken after childbirth (for recovery and, optionally, for 
breastfeeding).  
While the Member States are free to introduce measures enabling women greater protection 
under the PWD, measures vastly exceeding the protection required under the PWD, should 
still be more balanced in view of ensuring equality between men and women and should be 
more respective to the choices that the parents make. Therefore, maternity leave periods 
extending to e.g. 6 months (as in Hofmann), should not in themselves be immune to scrutiny 
as to whether the right balance between the aim of protecting women’s health-related interests 
and fathers’ rights to participate in the upbringing of their children (in their capacity as 
parents) has been struck. Also, in Member States that have made a clear distinction between 
compulsory and optional maternity leave or have introduced some of the maternity leave as 
sex-neutral (as in Montull), the measures should not be viewed in the framework of the PWD 
at all, but to the extent that the leave is clearly unrelated to sex-specific concerns, the measure 
should fall under the ETD.  
In its case law, the CJEU has made clear distinctions between (i) measures aimed to protect 
women’s biological condition before and after childbirth and the special relationship between 
a mother and her child (i.e. maternity leave), (ii) positive discrimination measures within the 
meaning of Art 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 ETD aiming to reduce factual inequalities between 
the sexes, and (iii) benefits being granted to workers in their capacity as parents of the child. 
Depending on the classification of the measure, the CJEU has reached different outcomes 
regarding the necessity to expand the entitlements to fathers and the level of scrutiny of the 
measures’ conformity with the principle of equal treatment for the sexes under the ETD has 
varied significantly. As can be seen from the previously examined case law, the CJEU has 
strongly refrained from interfering in the Member States’ legislation concerning maternity 
leave on grounds of equal treatment for the sexes under Art 14(1)(c) ETD. However, the level 
of scrutiny has been slightly more profound in cases where positive discrimination measures 
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or benefits granted solely for parenting reasons have been challenged on grounds of equal 
treatment.  
In Commission v France
119
 the Commission contested the legislation of France which 
reserved numerous special rights for women (e.g. “the shortening of working hours, for 
example for women over 59 years of age; the advancement of the retirement age; the 
obtaining of leave when a child is ill; the granting of additional days of annual leave in respect 
of each child”120 etc.). The Commission contended that it was contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women under the [now Art 14(1)(c) ETD] to maintain special 
entitlements to women that do not fall within the exceptions of protecting women’s health 
(pregnancy and childbirth related reasons) nor under the allowed positive discrimination 
measures.
121
 The CJEU, in its argumentation agreed that “some of the special rights preserved 
relate to the protection of women in their capacity as older workers or parents — categories to 
which both men and women may equally belong”122 and thus found the legislation to be in 
violation with the principle of equal treatment for men and women. Hence, the CJEU 
acknowledged that in the field of parental benefits, where the benefit is accorded to workers 
on grounds of their status as parents only (e.g. measures such as obtaining of leave when a 
child is ill, the granting of additional days of annual leave in respect of each child), the benefit 
should, in principle, be made available to parents of both sexes.  
In Griesmar,
123
 the CJEU examined a measure relating to childcare which was purportedly 
introduced to offset occupational disadvantages for women. Namely, under the contested 
legislation, female workers were granted a service credit for the calculation of retirement 
pension per each child they had
124
, whereas similar scheme was not available for male 
workers. The CJEU thus assessed whether the service credit was granted for the reason of 
women having been on maternity leave and consequently should be viewed as a measure 
aiming to offset the disadvantages caused by interruptions in their career
125
 or whether the 
service credit was granted for the reason of taking care of children with the assumption that 
women had brought up the children. The CJEU came to the conclusion that “the situations of 
a male civil servant and a female civil servant may be comparable as regard the bringing-up 
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of children. In particular, the fact that female civil servants are more affected by the 
occupational disadvantages entailed in bringing up children, because this is a task generally 
carried out by women, does not prevent their situation from being comparable to that of a 
male civil servant who has assumed the task of bringing up his children and has thereby been 
exposed to the same career-related disadvantages.”126 Thus, the CJEU found that the measure 
under scrutiny was discriminatory towards male workers and violated the principle of equal 
pay for men and women within the meaning of now Art 157 TFEU.  
In Griesmar, it is hard to imagine a different outcome as the allegedly positive discrimination 
measure was manifestly disproportionate towards male workers that had assumed their duties 
as parents and thus did not fulfil its aim while respecting the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women. In a similar case, decided a year later, the CJEU came to an opposite 
conclusion, though.  
In Lommers, the CJEU did not find that providing subsidised nursery places to female 
workers only (male workers having access to these nursery places in case of emergency only 
and in case male workers were bringing up their children on their own), would in principle 
infringe the principle of equal treatment for men and women.
127
 Interestingly, the CJEU did 
not find that subsidised nursery places for women should be viewed as “pay”128 and thus fall 
under the principle of equal pay for men and women within the meaning of now Art 157 
TFEU, but decided the case under now Art 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 ETD, classifying the 
measure as falling in the sphere of working conditions.
129
  
The CJEU thus examined the measure under now Art 3 ETD and came to the conclusion that 
“such a measure belongs to that group of measures that are designed to eliminate the causes of 
women's reduced opportunities of access to employment and careers and intended to improve 
the ability of women to compete on the labour market and pursue a career on an equal footing 
with men.”130 As to the proportionality of the measure, the CJEU found that considering the 
scarcity of nursery places and the fact that under the contested measure, men were not 
outright excluded from being entitled to the benefit (there was room for making exceptions in 
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case of emergency), the measure was proportionate to the aim sought.
131
 Hence, the CJEU 
found that the measure fell under the exception of Art 3 ETD and did not violate the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women under Art 14(1)(c) ETD.  
However, the findings of the CJEU are not self-evident regarding whether a measure such as 
the one under scrutiny in Lommers is truly capable of advancing substantive equality between 
men and women and reduce inequality of opportunity. It might be argued that by making 
childcare facilities more easily available to women, the measure does nothing more than 
reinforce the traditional perception of distribution of the roles of men and women. Namely, by 
granting nursery places preferentially to women, men might be discouraged to engage 
themselves with childcare issues. In that regard, AG Jacobs in his opinion in Marschall
132
 
noted that in his view “a gender-specific measure will not /…/ be proportionate to the aims of 
remedying specific inequalities faced by women in practice and promoting equal opportunity 
if the same result could be achieved by a gender-neutral provision.”133 AG Jacobs went on 
holding that, in his view, “by restricting to women the benefit of measures concerning 
childcare in particular may even be seen as running counter to the goal of treating men and 
women as equal participants in the workforce since it reinforces the assumption that women 
should have primary responsibility for childcare.”134 Indeed, as was also argued by the 
plaintiff in Lommers, the employer “had not demonstrated that the number of women staying 
in their jobs after taking maternity leave had increased as a result of the subsidised nursery 
places scheme”135 and that most employers in the Member State did not differentiate between 
men and women as regards access to similar subsidised nursery places.
136
 The arguments put 
forward clearly indicate that a gender-neutral scheme regarding access to subsidised nursery 
places could have been equally as effective and could have promoted equality of opportunity 
for women equally as efficiently and as such, the measure under scrutiny might not have 
fulfilled its purpose.  
In Roca Álvarez137 the question of expanding maternity related benefits to fathers was again 
brought before the CJEU. In Roca Álvarez, the father claimed leave from work to feed his 
child. However, the leave was only granted to fathers if the mother and the father of the child 
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were both employed
138
 (i.e. a father’s right to claim the leave depended on the mother’s right 
to claim the leave). As the mother of the child was self-employed and thus not entitled to 
claim the leave, the father of the child was refused from taking the leave. Hence, the father 
filed a complaint against his employer and the referring court was confronted with the 
question whether the [now ETD] prohibits a measure “which provides that female workers 
who are mothers and whose status is that of an employed person are entitled, in various ways, 
to take leave during the first nine months following the child’s birth, whereas male workers 
who are fathers with that same status are not entitled to the same leave unless the child’s 
mother is also an employed person.”139  
In that regard, the CJEU found that “the positions of a male and a female worker, father and 
mother of a young child, are comparable with regard to their possible need to reduce their 
daily working time in order to look after their child”140 and went on to analyse whether the 
differential treatment of fathers was justified by objective reasons. The CJEU then 
distinguished the case from maternity leave related cases, more specifically from Hofmann, 
and found that “the fact that the leave at issue in the main proceedings might be taken by the 
employed father or the employed mother without distinction means that feeding and devoting 
time to the child can be carried out just as well by the father as by the mother. Therefore this 
leave seems to be accorded to workers in their capacity as parents of the child.”141 Based on 
the foregoing argumentation, the CJEU did not find it convincing that the entitlement for 
fathers to claim leave for feeding the child should derive from the mothers as the holder of 
this right, but found that to hold that “a father with the same status [as the mother] can only 
enjoy this right but not be the holder of it, is liable to perpetuate a traditional distribution of 
the roles of men and women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to that of women in relation 
to the exercise of their parental duties.”142 Hence, the CJEU ruled that the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women necessitates that male workers should be entitled to claim leave 
for feeding the child in the same way as female workers.  
Roca Álvarez thus was the first case in which the CJEU adjusted the entitlements to maternity 
related benefits to current parental roles and the needs of the family. It can only be agreed 
with the reasoning that while breastfeeding concerns might have been initially relevant in 
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introducing the contested regulation, the advancement of fathers’ participation in childrearing 
matters and alternative options for feeding and taking care of the child necessitated an 
approach based on the parity of men and women in childrearing matters. In that regard, Roca 
Álvarez constitutes a significant development in the case law of the CJEU, guaranteeing 
substantive equality between the sexes and safeguarding both parents’ participation in 
childrearing matters in their capacity as parents.  
It can be further noted that in the field of parental benefits, the CJEU has been the most 
equality-minded in cases concerning equal access to parental leave schemes (i.e. measures 
granted solely for parenting reasons). In Konstantinos Maïstrellis143 the CJEU reviewed a 
national measure on parental leave under which male civil servants were entitled to parental 
leave in a situation where their wives did not work only where their wives were seriously ill 
or injured.
144
 The applicant, whose situation did not comply with the provision, was hence 
refused parental leave. The applicant appealed on the decision and the referring court sought 
to clarify whether the provision was contrary to the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women under the ETD and/or disregarded the minimum requirements under the [now the 
PLD].
145
  
The CJEU found, referring to now Clause 2(1) and Clause 2(2) PLD, that as a minimum 
requirement each of the child’s parents is individually entitled to parental leave for at least 
[now four] months and that Member States’ legislation cannot derogate from this minimum 
standard by e.g. denying one of the parents the right to parental leave because of the 
employment status of his wife.
146
 The CJEU also explained that the PLD is designed to 
“facilitate the reconciliation of parental and professional responsibilities for working 
parents,”147 an objective complying with Art 33(2) EUCFR, and serves the objective of 
“promoting women’s participation in the labour force’ and that men should be encouraged to 
assume an ‘equal share of family responsibilities’, inter alia by taking parental leave.”148 
Thus, any measures that would contravene these objectives would not be valid under the PLD. 
Moreover, the CJEU found, based on the findings of Griesmar, Commission v France, Roca 
Alvarez, that the contested measure which was awarded to civil servants in their capacity as a 
parent, did not comply with the ETD either, as the differential treatment of men and women 
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having the same parental status, amounted to direct discrimination on grounds of sex for 
which there was no justification.
149
 
Hence, it can be noted, based on the CJEU’s findings in Konstantinos Maïstrellis that 
differing from maternity leave, parental leave should be viewed as leave that is granted solely 
on grounds of parental status. Thus, any differential treatment of men and women in terms of 
the conditions of parental leave that would unjustifiably work against the objective of 
ensuring men’s more equal participation in childcare (i.e. guaranteeing substantive equality 
between the sexes in childrearing matters), would amount to direct discrimination on grounds 
of sex.  
In summary, the CJEU’s approach towards granting parental benefits for the father of the 
child on equal footing with the mother of the child, has evolved gradually and now entails a 
slightly more sophisticated view on equality between the sexes in childrearing matters. 
However, there are still considerable differences in the CJEU’s decisions as the CJEU has 
been keen on distinguishing between different parental benefits adopted in accordance with 
separate instruments, such as the PWD, the PLD and positive discrimination measures under 
Art 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 ETD. Based on the case law, it can be inferred that the CJEU has 
been the most protective of Member States’ legislation on maternity leave, although the 
contested measures have not always been clearly related to the protection of the women’s 
biological condition and health (e.g. as in Montull). By viewing measures enacted under the 
PWD as entirely independent of the ETD, the CJEU has not been able to strike a fair balance 
between parents’ needs, equality rights and the protection of health of pregnant women, 
women that have recently given birth and breastfeeding women. Positive discrimination 
measures have, on the other hand, been open to more scrutiny, although the CJEU has still 
rather rarely struck down positive discrimination measures in the field of parental benefits for 
being disproportionate in relation to fathers’ entitlements. In the field of parental leave, 
though, the CJEU has been the most equality-minded.  
Based on the selection of the CJEU’s case law, analysed above, it can be noted that fathers 
still have altogether less access to benefits relating to childcare under EU anti-discrimination 
law and the CJEU has not been willing to compensate for the legislative discrepancies 
between the entitlements of fathers and mothers, securing women’s primary role as caretakers 
in the family. It is noteworthy, that the CJEU in its practice has often failed to take account 
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the substantive equality arguments and has interpreted the PWD and the ETD as entirely 
separate instruments, while the ETD should allow the CJEU to assess the necessity and 
function of measures enacted even under the PWD.  
By drawing a distinction between the entitlements of mothers and fathers, the CJEU has, in 
many cases ignored the principle of equality of the sexes and the aim to achieve substantive 
equality for the sexes (Art 3 TEU). Based on the current trend towards more equal burden 
sharing, the EU legislation and the CJEU practice should support more substantive equality 
for the sexes and should be more focused on acknowledging parenting as a social role. As to 
the latter aim, the interpretative tools that the CJEU has (the need to advance fundamental 
rights as guaranteed under the EUCFR – the importance of the equality principle in EU 
legislation) should enable it to progress in its case law, in the direction better suited for 
parents’ needs.  
In summary, the parental benefits scheme under EU anti-discrimination legislation does not 
comply with the principle of equality for men and women in the best possible way. Thus, it 
would be desirable if the parental benefits schemes relating to childcare would become more 
equally accessible to both of the parents. Also, maternity leave under the PWD could offer 
more flexibility, especially in case of longer maternity leaves, by allowing women to return to 
work before the end of their maternity leave without their families having to suffer financial 
consequences thereof, e.g. by providing for transferable maternity leave periods which could 
equally be taken by the fathers as well. As paternity leave and parental leave schemes are not 
equally as generously remunerated as maternity leave, women might face unwanted pressure 
from their partners to stay at home until the end of their maternity leave, especially so in the 
Member States that have introduced longer maternity leaves. Hence, to the extent that 
maternity leave aims to protect the special relationship between a mother and her child, 
fathers should have more room to argue for equal access to such benefits. 
Next, as a source of comparison, the case law of the ECtHR on fathers’ claims will be 
analysed to verify to which extent the courts’ rulings have coincided and to which extent the 
equality guarantees under EU anti-discrimination law and the ECHR differ. 
 
2.1.2. Fathers’ entitlements to parental benefits under the case law of the ECtHR 
The ECtHR has also been confronted with the issue of equal treatment for men and women 
regarding parental benefits. As the rights envisaged in the ECHR constitute general principles 
45 
 
of the Union's law under Art 6(3) TEU and should be viewed coherently with similar rights 
enacted under the EUCFR, it is interesting to compare the case law of the CJEU to that of the 
ECtHR to verify to what extent the cases decided under EU anti-discrimination law follow the 
reasoning of the ECtHR.  
The case law concerning fathers’ access to parental benefits under the ECHR relates to the 
rights envisaged under Art 8 ECHR in conjunction with Art 14 ECHR. According to Art 8(1) 
ECHR, everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. Under Art 8(2) ECHR, there shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except for on the grounds listed in Art 8(2) ECHR, i.e. on 
grounds related to the protection of public interests and the protection of rights and freedoms 
of others. Art 14 ECHR sets out the prohibition of discrimination on a non-exhaustive list of 
grounds, Art 14 ECHR is not a free-standing article, but can be invoked only in conjunction 
with another article of the ECHR, i.e. it is applicable according to its wording only in relation 
to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the ECHR].” The application of Art 
14 ECHR does not necessarily presuppose the violation of the substantive rights guaranteed 
under the ECHR, but it is sufficient for the facts of the case to fall within the ambit of one or 
more articles of the ECHR.
150
 In that regard, parental benefits fall within the ambit of Art 8 
ECHR as „parental leave and related allowances promote family life and necessarily affect the 
way in which it is organised.“151 Hence, introducing differential access to parental benefits for 
the sexes ifalls within the prohibition of discrimination under Art 14 ECHR. 
In Petrovic v Austria
152
 the ECtHR was confronted with the issue of equal treatment between 
the sexes in a case concerning parental leave allowances. The applicant, a father that took care 
of his newborn child while the mother of the child returned to work, was refused parental 
leave allowance that under the contested legislation was available only for women.
153
 Thus, 
the applicant claimed that the legislation violated Art 8 and Art 14 of the ECHR, by 
introducing differential treatment for the sexes concerning the entitlement to parental leave 
allowance. The ECtHR acknowledged that unlike maternity leave which is granted for women 
to enable them to recover from childbirth, parental leave relates to the period after that and is 
intended to enable the parent to look after the child personally and that “so far as taking care 
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of the child during this period is concerned, both parents are “similarly placed.””154 However, 
the ECtHR found no violation of Art 8 ECHR in conjunction with Art 14 ECHR in terms of 
the father’s equal access to the benefit as the ECtHR took the view that while the 
advancement of the equality of the sexes was a major goal for the States Parties, the State’s 
refusal to grant the applicant parental benefits came within the State’s margin of appreciation 
(during the time, there was no consensus among States Parties on the issue)
155
. 
In their joint dissenting opinion, judges Bernhardt and Spielmann came to the opposite 
conclusion. They brought out that “the discrimination against fathers perpetuates traditional 
distribution of roles and can also have negative consequences for the mother”156 by 
influencing the mother to stay at home. Also, in their dissenting opinion, the judges accurately 
noted that if the States introduce parental benefits schemes, “traditional practices and roles in 
family life alone do not justify a difference in treatment of men and women” and that “a State, 
when opting for one system, is not permitted to grant benefits in a discriminatory manner.”157 
It is hard not to agree with this dissenting argumentation that has further been represented in 
the more progressive case law of the ECtHR concerning equal treatment for the sexes. 
Namely, once it is verified that the contested legislation constitutes direct discrimination on 
grounds of sex, very weighty reasons should be advanced to justify the difference of 
treatment. Concerning the justification of direct discrimination, it cannot be considered as 
sufficient to note that the practice of the States Parties is not advanced enough, as the kind of 
argumentation only leads to the levelling down of human rights protection which cannot be 
viewed as compatible with the ECHR. In its further case law, the ECtHR has been more 
advanced in combating discrimination on grounds of sex. 
In Weller v Hungary,
158
 the ECtHR adjudicated on a case in which a father applied for 
maternity benefit that under the contested legislation was only granted to mothers, adoptive 
parents and guardians of the child.
159
 Following the authorities’ refusal to grant him the 
benefit, the applicant appealed, claiming that the contested regulation was discriminatory and 
violated Art 8 ECHR in conjunction with Art 14 ECHR.  
The ECtHR assessed the conditions of granting the benefit and came to the conclusion that the 
“wide range of entitled persons proves that the allowance is aimed at supporting newborn 
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children and the whole family raising them, and not only at reducing the hardship of giving 
birth sustained by the mother.”160 Thus, the ECtHR found that the applicant was discriminated 
against on grounds of his parental status for which the ECtHR found to be no objective 
justification. While acknowledging the States’ autonomy to decide on the standard of 
protection under their social security system, the ECtHR held that “the lack of a common 
standard does not absolve those States which adopt family allowance schemes from making 
such grants without discrimination.”161 Hence, the State is tied with the principle of equal 
treatment whenever it chooses to introduce benefits facilitating childcare, regardless of the 
State’s margin of appreciation in introducing such a benefit overall.  
Weller v Hungary thus marked a change in the ECtHR’s adjudication in matters relating to 
father’s equal access to parental benefits. Compared to Petrovic v Austria, it can be noted that 
while the ECtHR still acknowledged the States’ margin of appreciation in deciding on the 
level of protection granted under the States Parties’ social security system for parenting 
reasons, it nevertheless changed its position regarding to the States Parties’ freedom to 
introduce discriminatory measures when it decides to make parental benefits available. 
It is also interesting to compare Weller v Hungary to the CJEU’s case law concerning equal 
access to maternity benefits, especially to the rulings in Hofmann and Montull. Namely, while 
the ECtHR has been willing to accept that maternity benefits, especially those that exceed 
measures necessary for the protection of a mother’s health (or are not clearly introduced for 
that purpose), do fall within the ambit of prohibition of discrimination, the CJEU has 
constantly held that paid maternity leave, in part, legitimately enables only the mother of the 
child to adjust to her parental role (including safeguarding the opportunity to breastfeed a 
child). Thus, the CJEU has seldom scrutinized Member States’ legislation on maternity leave 
from the viewpoint of equality of the sexes under the ETD but has been more prone to rule 
that maternity leave (and related benefits) fall outside the prohibition of discrimination under 
the ETD, regardless of the duration of maternity leave and regardless of the eligibility 
conditions to maternity leave.  
As to the aim of maternity leave, the EctHR has ruled e.g in Petrovic v Austria that „maternity 
leave and the associated allowances are primarily intended to enable the mother to recover 
from the fatigue of childbirth and to breastfeed her baby if she so wishes.“162 Hence, the two 
courts have followed a similar line of argumentation as to the aim of maternity leave, 
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however, the EctHR (according to the rationale of Weller v Hungary) has viewed maternity 
leave foremost as aiming to protect women’s health and has thus applied a more strict 
standard of scrutiny under Art 14 ECHR to maternity-related measures not clearly pursuing 
women’s health protection. It is noteworthy that in Montull, the eligibility conditions to the 
maternity benefit were practically identical to those in Weller v Hungary
163
 – however, the 
two courts reached entirely different outcomes in terms of striking down discriminatory 
practices. In that regard, the ECtHR has clearly taken the approach more consistent with the 
principle of equal treatment for the sexes.  
The ECtHR has also been protective of the equal treatment for the sexes in parental leave 
cases. In Konstantin Markin v Russia, the ECtHR adjudicated on a case relating to a father’s 
entitlements to parental leave. Namely, a father of three children applied for parental leave as 
he remained the sole caretaker of his three children after the birth of his third child. Under the 
contested legislation, women in military service could apply for three years’ parental leave, 
but not men, who could only apply for a three months’ parental leave.164 The applicant thus 
argued that the refusal to grant him three years’ parental leave violated the principle of equal 
treatment. 
The ECtHR first held that while the States Parties enjoy a margin of appreciation “whether 
and what differences in otherwise similar situations justify differential treatment,“165 „the 
advancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of 
Europe and very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before such a difference of 
treatment could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.”166 The ECtHR further found 
that parental leave comes within the scope of Art 8 ECHR as “by enabling one of the parents 
to stay at home to look after the children, parental leave and related allowances promote 
family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised.”167 Hence, parental leave 
must be accorded to the parents, respecting Art 14 ECHR.  
With regards to the justification of unequal treatment between servicemen and servicewomen, 
the ECtHR contended that “contemporary European societies have moved towards a more 
equal sharing between men and women of responsibility for the upbringing of their children 
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and that men’s caring role has gained recognition,”168 thus the state’s margin of appreciation 
in introducing differential treatment regarding parental benefits for servicemen had decreased. 
Neither did the ECtHR find convincing Russia’s argumentation that the contested legislation 
aimed to reduce factual inequalities between men and women (i.e. that it constituted a positive 
discrimination measure), stating that “such difference has the effect of perpetuating gender 
stereotypes and is disadvantageous both to women’s careers and to men’s family life”169 and 
that “States may not impose traditional gender roles and gender stereotypes.”170 Hence, the 
ECtHR found the measure to be discriminatory and in violation of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. 
In Konstantin Markin v Russia, the ECtHR thus sent a powerful signal that the advancement 
of gender equality is a major goal also for the Council of Europe, hence the States Parties’ 
margin of appreciation in terms of differentiating between the entitlements to parental benefits 
for different sexes is limited and measures imposing different eligibility conditions to parental 
benefits can only be viewed as proportionate for very weighty reasons. J. Gerards has noted 
that in general, “the ECtHR applies a “very weighty reasons” test if it finds that a ground is 
commonly held suspect by the various [States Parties]” /.../ in those cases [the ECtHR] is very 
strict and a justification will hardly ever be accepted.”171 Concerning parental leave, i.e. leave 
granted solely for men and women in their capacity as parents, it is very difficult to reliably 
justify differential treatment for the sexes. In that regard, the positions of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR coincide with both of the courts stressing the need to avoid reinforcing gender 
stereotypes in introducing parental leave schemes. Moreover, the CJEU has, e.g. in 
Konstantinos Maïstrellis, stressed the need to encourage men to take up parental leave 
(arguing for substantive equality) under the PLD. Thus, concerning parental leave schemes, 
the CJEU’s standard of scrutiny coincides with that of the ECtHR and unequal treatment of 
the sexes is most likely to be struck down.  
Similarly to the EU anti-discrimination law measures, positive discrimination is also allowed 
under Art 14 ECHR, which, however does not expressly authorize such measures, unlike e.g. 
Art 23(2) EUCFR, Art 157(4) TFEU and Art 3 ETD. In Andrle v. the Czech Republic the 
ECtHR scrutinized Czech legislation concerning the State’s pension scheme. The plaintiff, a 
father of two children, argued that the contested legislation was discriminatory since under the 
                                                          
168
 Ibid., para. 140. 
169
 Ibid., para. 141. 
170
 Ibid., para. 142. 
171
 J. Gerards „Discrimination grounds“ in D.Schiek, L.Waddington and M. Bell (eds) „Cases, Materials and 
Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law,“ Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007, 
para. 1.2., p. 36. 
50 
 
legislation, women’s pensionable age was determined by the number of children they had, 
while the pensionable age for men was not dependant on the number of children they had.
172
 
Despite the difference of the pensionable age for men, the ECtHR ruled that the States are 
allowed under Art 14 ECHR to introduce measures designed for “treating groups differently 
in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them.”173 Although the ECtHR reiterated 
that “very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a 
difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the 
Convention,”174 it was nevertheless willing to accept that the measure pursued a legitimate 
aim as it was enacted to compensate “for the factual inequality and hardship arising out of the 
combination of the traditional mothering role of women and the social expectation of their 
involvement in work on a full-time basis.”175 As to the proportionality of the measure, the 
ECtHR found that the States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation to determine when the 
“the unfairness to men begins to outweigh the need to correct the disadvantaged position of 
women by means of affirmative action.”176 Thus, the ECtHR found the legislation lowering 
pensionable age only for women for reason of their childrearing obligations, was in 
conformity with the principle of non-discrimination under Art 14 ECHR. 
Thus, similarly to EU anti-discrimination legislation, it is allowed under Art 14 ECHR to 
introduce positive discrimination measures to compensate for the factual inequalities that exist 
between men and women, subject to proportionality review of such measures. Concerning 
pensionable age more specifically, EU anti-discrimination legislation differs slightly, as under 
Art 7(a) of Directive 79/7/EEC
177
 equal treatment for men and women in matters of social 
security cannot impair the Member States’ right to determine the pensionable age. Thus, 
under EU anti-discrimination law the determination of pensionable age is outside the scope of 
scrutiny for its correspondence to the principle of equal treatment for the sexes. However, the 
methodologies implemented by both of the courts in reviewing positive discrimination 
measures coincide as to the strict proportionality test.  
In summary, it can be concluded that there are many similarities between the rulings of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU in cases concerning equal access to parental benefits. In comparison to 
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the practice of the CJEU, the ECtHR has likewise distinguished between maternity leave 
(granted for women with the aim to protect their health and recovery from childbirth), 
parental leave (granted for both of the parents in their capacity as a parent) and positive 
discrimination measures, applying a slightly different standard of scrutiny to such measures. 
However, compared to the practice of the CJEU, the ECtHR in its case law has been more 
open to assess the purpose of and eligibility conditions to maternity benefits and has viewed 
the legitimate purpose of maternity leave primarily as connected to safeguarding women’s 
health (not including the protection of the special relationship between a mother and her child, 
as advanced in the case law of the CJEU). Thus, under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, fathers can 
more effectively challenge maternity-related measures that disproportionately restrict fathers’ 
access to these benefits. In that regard, the wider purpose of maternity leave, as advanced by 
the CJEU does not guarantee equal treatment for the sexes as efficiently. Neither is the wider 
purpose of maternity leave as self-evident under the PWD either, as according to the preamble 
to the PWD, the PWD itself is mainly seen as measure aimed to protect workers’ health for 
reasons of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding.  
Also, it can be noted that the non-discrimination principle in EU anti-discrimination law is 
applied more narrowly. In the case law of the ECtHR, it is required that the non-
discrimination principle should be respected whenever States Parties wish to enact new 
legislation that is connected to the enjoyment of rights under the ECHR, e.g. in the field of 
parental benefits. Thus, whenever the States Parties grant new parental benefits, they must 
guarantee that access to these benefits would be granted on a non-discriminatory basis under 
Art 14 ECHR (i.e. an open-ended non-discrimination clause, capable of extending to unlisted 
grounds). In the practice of the CJEU, although the principle of non-discrimination has been 
viewed as one of the general principles of EU law
178
, which should form an individual ground 
for review of the measure’s compliance with EU law179, it has not been given such 
significance in the field of equal access to parental benefits. E.g. in Montull, the CJEU 
refrained from taking a position concerning the differential access to entitlements of the 
adoptive parents and biological fathers, excluding discrimination on grounds of parental status 
from the scope of EU law. Thus, it still is necessary for the plaintiff to argue that the contested 
discriminatory practice is prohibited under a specific EU instrument and that the situation is 
covered by the protected grounds.  
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Also, curiously, neither of the courts has viewed the parents’ entitlements to parental benefits 
as connected to the protection of the rights of the child. Although the rights of the child (e.g. 
in Art 23 EUCFR) necessitate that the child should develop a personal relationship and direct 
contact with both of his/her parents and that in all actions relating to children, the children’s 
best interest should be taken into account, the courts have detached parental benefits from 
these considerations. In Konstantinos Maïstrellis, the CJEU expressly dismissed the 
argumentation that the rights of the child come into consideration what concerns e.g. parental 
leave. However, it could be argued that maternity/parental leave schemes also advance 
children’s rights by providing them with the best possible care during the most delicate time 
after their birth and facilitating the integration of the child into its family. Thus, if the 
legislation disregards disproportionally and contrarily to the principle of equal treatment one 
of the parents’ rights in terms of access to maternity/parental leave schemes, it necessarily 
influences the rights of the child as well, by disregarding the best interests of the child (Art 
23(2) EUCFR) and to a lesser extent the right to a personal relationship and direct contact 
with both of his/her parents (Art 23(3) EUCFR). 
 
2.2. Case law of the CJEU and ECtHR concerning access to parental benefits for 
atypical families 
In the previous subchapter, fathers’ equal access to parental benefits under the case law of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU was examined. However, not only do fathers have incentives to 
challenge measures introducing differential access to parental benefits. Namely, atypical 
families have an often uncertain position regarding their entitlements to state guarantees in the 
field of parental benefits. Among such families are families that have resorted to surrogacy. 
The rapid development of reproductive medicine has introduced novel ways of having 
children and has thus enabled infertile couples to become parents by taking advantage of these 
methods. As a consequence of developments in the field of reproductive medicine, an 
alternative to adopting or bearing a child – surrogacy – has rapidly emerged.  
Surrogacy is surrounded by controversies as it raises serious social and ethical issues. Some of 
the rights issues that have arisen in relation to surrogacy include concerns in relation to child 
abandonment and suspected child trafficking, doubts about the suitability of the intended 
parents and about the free and informed consent of surrogate mothers, the contractual terms of 
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the surrogate agreements and concerns in relation to unscrupulous intermediaries.
180
 On the 
other hand, surrogacy serves the rights of infertile couples, enabling them to found a family 
despite their physical impediments. Hence, as surrogacy is related to controversial rights 
issues, there is no uniform approach to surrogacy within the Member States. The lack of 
consensus among European states on the recognition of surrogacy has also led to diverse 
outcomes on the recognition of parental rights of the intended/commissioning parents, which 
in turn also touches upon the issue of equal treatment of the intended/commissioning parents 
vis à vis biological/gestational parents. Namely, EU anti-discrimination law has been 
challenged with the question whether non-recognition of maternity/paternity rights (including 
non-recognition of entitlements deriving from EU legislation in the field of labour law, such 
as maternity/parental leave) of the intended parents amounts to unlawful discrimination.  
 
2.2.1. Case law of the CJEU concerning commissioning parents’ entitlements to 
maternity leave and adoption leave 
The issue of equal treatment of the intended/commissioning mothers at workplace was 
recently brought before the CJEU in two cases – C.D. v S.T.181 and Z. v A Government 
Department.
182
 In both of these cases, the intended mothers who were awarded full parental 
responsibility, claimed that they were entitled to maternity/adoption leave, but were denied it 
by their employers.  
In C.D. v S.T. the applicant filed a complaint against her employer after the latter’s refusal to 
grant her maternity leave, claiming that she was discriminated against on grounds of sex, 
relying accordingly on the PWD and the ETD. Hence, in C.D. v S.T. the referring court sought 
to establish whether the PWD was also applicable in case where the commissioning mother 
(having full parental responsibility) had not been pregnant nor given birth to the child, but 
was breastfeeding the child since its birth.
183
 Also, the referring court sought to establish 
whether the treatment of the plaintiff amounted to discrimination under Art 14, in conjunction 
with Art 2(l)(a) and/or (b) and/or 2(2)(c) of the ETD.
184
  
The CJEU considered the questions referred and found that as regards the applicability of the 
PWD, „it follows from the objective of [the PWD], from the wording of Art 8 PWD, which 
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expressly refers to [childbirth], and from the case-law of the Court /.../, that the purpose of the 
maternity leave provided for in Art 8 PWD is to protect the health of the mother of the child 
in the especially vulnerable situation arising from her pregnancy.“185 The CJEU further 
clarified that as regards the objective of protecting the special relationship of a woman and her 
child, it „concerns only the period after 'pregnancy and childbirth.’“186 Thus, the CJEU found 
that the PWD does not necessitate Member States to grant maternity leave to women that have 
themselves not been pregnant nor given birth, however, Member States may, on their own 
initiative, enact more favourable legislation, covering intended mothers as well.
187
 
As regards the discrimination claim on grounds of sex under the ETD, the CJEU compared 
the entitlements of a commissioning mother to that of a commissioning father and found that 
as neither of the comparable groups were entitled to paid maternity leave, the contested 
refusal by the employer to grant maternity leave was not based on a reason that applies 
exclusively to employees of one sex.
188
 Hence, the CJEU ruled that the prohibition of 
discrimination under the ETD was not infringed as the CJEU found no direct discrimination 
on grounds of sex and neither did the CJEU find evidence of indirect discrimination on 
grounds of sex.
189
 
In Z. v A Government Department the intended mother, similarly to C.D. v S.T. argued that 
she was entitled to leave equivalent to that of maternity or adoption leave, which the employer 
refused to grant her. The plaintiff argued that her employer’s refusal to grant her paid leave 
constituted discrimination against her on grounds of gender, disability for having no uterus 
(although, it relates to an interesting sequel of case law in EU anti-discrimination legislation, 
this ground will not be analysed for the purpose of this thesis) and family status (the multiple 
grounds invoked relate also to multiple discrimination issues). The referring court thus wanted 
to clarify whether in light of Articles 21, 23, 33 and 34 EUCFR, it constituted discrimination 
on grounds of sex within the meaning of Articles 4 and 14 ETD if a „woman whose genetic 
child has been born through a surrogacy arrangement, and who is responsible for the care of 
her genetic child from birth is refused paid leave from employment equivalent to maternity 
leave and/or adoptive leave.“190  
The CJEU, consistently with C.D. v S.T. chose the commissioning father as the comparator 
and came to the conclusion that the employer’s refusal to grant the applicant maternity leave 
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did not constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sex under the ETD; neither did the 
CJEU find any evidence to suspect that the applicant had been indirectly discriminated 
against.
191
 The CJEU further reiterated that Member States are not obliged to grant maternity 
leave to a commissioning mother under the PWD as the entitlement to maternity leave derives 
from a mother’s pregnancy and childbirth.192 Analysing the claim of unequal treatment as 
compared to adoptive parents under the ETD, the CJEU came to the conclusion that Art 16 
ETD has limited scope – namely it „preserves the freedom of the Member States to grant or 
not to grant adoption leave, and that the conditions for the implementation of such leave, other 
than dismissal and return to work, are outside the scope of that directive.“193 Hence, the CJEU 
found no discrimination neither on grounds of sex nor on grounds of family status. 
It is noteworthy that AG Wahl in his opinion
194
 and AG Kokott in her opinion
195
 reached 
different outcomes regarding discriminatory treatment of the applicants and the possibility to 
extend the instruments to the cases. While AG Wahl supported the CJEU’s later findings and 
interpreted the case strictly, AG Kokott laid more emphasis on the necessity to protect human 
rights as envisaged in the EUCFR and thus interpreted the provisions in light of EU primary 
law. 
AG Wahl, while not ruling out the possibility that there had been discrimination on grounds 
of parental status vis à vis adoptive parents, in his concluding remarks explained his restrictive 
interpretation taken under the framework of the PWD and the ETD by stating that „it is not 
for the Court to substitute itself for the legislature by engaging in constructive interpretation 
that would involve reading into [the respective directives] something that is simply not there. 
That /.../ would amount to encroaching upon the legislative prerogative.“196 However, 
engaging with teleological interpretation in light of human rights protection as necessitated by 
the EUCFR, has not been that uncommon in the case law of the CJEU. E.g. in P v S and 
Cornwall County Council, the CJEU expanded the notion of discrimination on grounds of sex 
to cover gender reassignment cases in light of human rights protection
197
; in Chatzi, the CJEU 
found that Art 20 EUCFR necessitates that national legislator should have special regard to 
the needs of the parents of twins for the purpose of safequarding the principle of equal 
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treament which is one of the fundamental principles of EU law,
198
 in Mangold the CJEU 
proliferated discrimination on grounds of age, as an expression of the general principle of 
equal treatment, to the status of general principle of EU law
199
 to rule against age 
dscrimination etc. Thus, the CJEU has in its case law advanced the principle of equal 
treatment by engaging with human rights’ argumentation.  
Hence, laying emphasis on human rights protection, AG Kokott based her argumentation on 
Articles 24(3) and 7 EUCFR in conjunction with the relevant articles of the PWD. Art 7 
EUCFR provides that „everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications“ and Art 24(3) EUCFR provides that „every child shall have the 
right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or 
her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.“ Furthermore, according to Art 24(2) 
EUCFR „in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private 
institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration.“ Thus, in light of the 
aforementioned articles, AG Kokott expanded the protection granted to working gestational 
mothers to commissioning mothers under the PWD, in case where the commissioning mother 
was breastfeeding the child. 
As AG Kokott noted, Art 2(c) PWD lists workers who are breastfeeding as coming within the 
scope of the PWD. Moreover, the situation of a breastfeeding commissioning mother is 
comparable with the situation of a breastfeeding biological mother, also in terms of health 
risks necessitating special protection at workplace and in terms of time demands associating 
with childcare.
200
 Furthermore, as one of the aims of maternity leave is to protect the special 
relationship between a woman and her child following childbirth, a position consistent with 
Articles 24(3) and 7 EUCFR, this relationship should not be impaired by the mother’s 
simultaneous pursuit of employment.
201
  
In that regard, AG Kokott even suggested that „the objective of protection based on the 
mother-child relationship even suggests that [the PWD] must apply generally to intended 
mothers irrespective of whether or not they breastfeed their child“202 as similarly to a 
biological mother „she is faced with the challenge of bonding with that child, integrating it 
into the family and adjusting to her role as a mother.“203 AG Kokott thus took the view that 
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Art 2 PWD „must be understood in functional rather than monistic biological terms“204 and 
that after assuming full responsibility and care for her newborn infant, the commissioning 
mother „takes the place of its biological mother, and from that point onwards she must have 
the same rights as would otherwise be conferred on the surrogate mother.“205 Namely, „if 
intended mothers were to be excluded from the scope of [the PWD], that would ultimately be 
to the detriment of children born to a surrogate mother and contrary to the basic idea 
expressed in Art 24 EUCFR, under which in all actions relating to children, whether taken by 
public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary 
consideration.“206 
The view that AG Kokott took followed the logic that maternity leave enjoys EU primary law 
protection by being rooted in Articles 7 and 24 EUCFR and that maternity leave should be 
interpreted according to these articles. Hence, the CJEU could have taken into account that 
the commissioning mothers’ equal access to maternity leave schemes guarantees first and 
foremost the protection of the child’s best interests which the CJEU has duty to safeguard. In 
the light of the reason why childcare is provided, namely to ensure the welfare of the child,
207
 
it could not be regarded as in the best interests of the child if he/she will be left without direct 
contact of either of his parents during the delicate period following his/her birth. Namely, 
under Art 24 EUCFR, it is the best interests of the child that have to be secured, thus Art 24 
EUCFR does not merely necessitate to take the children’s interests into account but to ensure 
that in all measures concerning children, the interests of the children would be the primary 
consideration. While the duty to safeguard the children’s best interests is a very wide one and 
depends on the circumstances of the case, there are some factors that are given more weight 
than the others in deciding on the measures’ compliance with the best interests of the children. 
E.g. „the principles of non-discrimination, maximum survival and development, and respect 
for the child’s own opinions must all be relevant to determining what the best interests of a 
child are in a particular situation.“208 From the above-referred factors, the principle of non-
discrimination of the children is the most relevant, as children should not be negatively 
influenced on grounds of their birth status
209
, hence parental benefits that facilitate the 
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integration of the children into their families’ should not differentiate between the manner of 
conception and birth conditions of the children. 
Regrettably the CJEU interpreted the directives restrictively, viewing motherhood only as a 
biological role, even when the commissioning mother had assumed the task of breastfeeding 
the child after its birth. Although, admittedly, during its drafting, the PWD did not echo the 
developments in the field of reproductive medicine, in view of the EUCFR, especially in light 
of Art 7 and 24 EUCFR, more emphasis could have still been placed especially on protecting 
the children’s best interests and the family as a unit. 
Also, in regard to the argumentation about unequal treatment of the commissioning parents 
vis à vis adoptive parents, the CJEU could have paid more respect for human rights 
arguments. Namely, Art 20 EUCFR establishes the principle of equal treatment which is to be 
given full effect when interpreting EU law and Art 21 EUCFR contains the prohibition of 
discrimination in EU law. Although, it can be agreed that under the ETD the 
intended/commissioning mothers were not directly discriminated against on grounds of sex 
(the comparator being a male commissioning parent), the principle of equal treatment could 
have been nevertheless given due regard when establishing discrimination of the 
commissioning mothers vis à vis adoptive mothers. The principle of equal treatment dictates 
that in cases where the Member States have in accordance with Art 16 ETD introduced 
adoption leave, it should be of uniform application to all similar parenting forms. Therefore, 
introducing differential treatment to similarly situated commissioning parents in comparison 
with adoptive parents, should amount to direct discrimination. 
Thus, although there is currently no consensus among European states on recognition of 
surrogacy, the CJEU in C.D. v S.T. and Z. v A Government Department nevertheless failed to 
take into account the rights of the children born through surrogacy arrangement, ignoring that 
their rights are „acutely at risk due to the circumstances of their conception and birth in this 
manner.“210 By not expanding the legal entitlement to maternity leave for the intended 
mothers, the CJEU failed to respect the delicate relationship between children born through 
surrogacy arrangements and their intended parents during the most sensitive time after birth. 
In that regard, it is interesting to compare whether the advancement of children’s best interests 
are better represented in the ECtHR’s case law on surrogacy. 
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2.2.2. Case law of the ECtHR on surrogacy and benefits granted to parents whose family 
ties with their children are legally not recognized 
The ECtHR has been confronted with a few cases relating to surrogacy, namely cases 
concerning the states’ margin of appreciation whether to acknowledge the ties between 
commissioning parents and their children. Although the ECtHR has not been called to 
adjudicate on matters concerning commissioning parents’ entitlements to childcare benefits 
under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, it has nevertheless examined a few cases concerning the 
entitlements to parental benefits of the adoptive parents and “illegitimate” parents (i.e. parents 
whose parental ties with their children have not gained legal recognition by the state), which 
can, on the basis of analogous facts, be relevant in possible similar commissioning parents’ 
claims as well. 
First, it is important to verify whether the families raising their children born under surrogacy 
agreements have gained recognition by the ECtHR. In Mennesson v France
211
 and Labassee v 
France
212
, the ECtHR was confronted with the question whether non-recognition of parental 
ties between commissioning parents and their children amounted to violation of Art 8 ECHR. 
In Mennesson v France and Labassee v France, the commissioning parents entered into a 
surrogacy agreement, under which the surrogate mother gave birth to children that were 
genetically related to one of the intended parents.
213
 The French authorities, however, refused 
to enter the birth certificates of the children in the French central register of births, marriages 
and deaths under the “public policy clause” as the recognition of the children’s birth 
certificate would have, in the authorities’ view, been contrary to the French public policy.214 
The applicants appealed the decision and claimed that the decision did not respect the 
children’s best interests and violated Art 8 ECHR independently, as well as in conjunction 
with Art 14 ECHR by disregarding the right to a stable legal parent-child relationship. 
The ECtHR examined the alleged breach of Art 8 ECHR in Mennesson v France and found 
that, in principle, “the refusal of the French authorities to legally recognise the family tie 
between the applicants amounts to an “interference” in their right to respect for their family 
life.”215 The ECtHR then went on to test the proportionality of the measure in order to verify 
whether the interference of the applicants’ rights under Art 8 ECHR amounted to a breach of 
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that article. The ECtHR found that the contested acts of the French authorities were based on 
the law that expressly viewed surrogacy agreements as contrary to public policy, and that the 
legislation pursued legitimate aims.
216
 The ECtHR noted that, in accordance with Art 8(2) 
ECHR, the legislation was aimed to “deter [French] nationals from having recourse to 
methods of assisted reproduction outside the national territory that are prohibited on its own 
territory and aims /…/ to protect children and /…/ surrogate mothers.”217  
Thus, in principle, the ECtHR acknowledged that states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
when it comes to recognizing “a legal parent-child relationship between children legally 
conceived as the result of a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended parents.”218 
Nevertheless, the margin of appreciation is reduced, as the legal parent-child relationship 
relates to “an essential aspect of the identity of individuals.”219 Furthermore, when assessing 
the proportionality of such measures, States “must have regard to the essential principle 
according to which whenever the situation of a child is in issue, the best interests of that child 
are paramount.”220 Building on the argumentation, the ECtHR distinguished between the 
rights of the children and the rights of their parents under Art 8 ECHR, finding that as it was 
not made impossible for the family to live together in France and “in conditions broadly 
comparable to those of other families,”221 the rights of the intended parents were not infringed 
under Art 8 ECHR. However, the protection of the best interests of the children necessitates 
that the children’s identity (nationality, legal parent-child relationship) would not be impaired 
by the State, even more so as one of the intended parents was the children’s biological 
parent.
222
 Hence, the ECtHR found that the children’s rights under Art 8 ECHR were 
infringed
223
 and that the State ought to have recognized the family ties of the children and 
their parents to respect the right to identity of these children. The same outcome was also 
reached in Labassee v France. 
The ECtHR’s judgements in Mennesson v France and Labassee v France were open-ended as 
to the question how much weight the fact, that the children were biologically related to one of 
the intended parents, carried in the findings of the ECtHR. The ECtHR’s judgement in 
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Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy,
224
 which has been referred to the Grand Chamber, may shed 
more light on this matter. 
In Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, the intended parents were not biologically related
225
 to 
their child, born as a result of a surrogacy agreement. The intended parents lodged a 
complaint against the Italian authorities after they failed to gain recognition of a Russian birth 
certificate, acknowledging the parent-child relationship between them and the child born 
under a surrogacy agreement and after the child had been removed from their care without 
proper investigation to the fact whether the child had been neglected.
226
 The ECtHR was thus 
called to address whether the applicants’ rights under Art 8 ECHR were infringed by the 
authorities’ acts.  
In examining whether the family life under Art 8 ECHR was worthy of protection, the ECtHR 
noted that although the child was in the applicants’ family for only approximately 6 months, 
“the applicants had acted as parents towards the child, [hence] there existed a de facto family 
life between the applicants and the child”227 and the case fell under Art 8 ECHR. The ECtHR 
further held that “the State had an obligation to take the child’s best interests into account 
irrespective of the nature of the parental link, genetic or otherwise”228 which meant that the 
family life of the applicants could only be interrupted by removal of the child if the child 
would have been faced with immediate danger. As this was not the case, the ECtHR found 
that there had been an infringement of the applicants’ rights under Art 8 ECHR. Furthermore, 
the ECtHR held that the States had the obligation “to ensure that a child is not disadvantaged 
on account of the fact that he or she was born to a surrogate mother,”229 thus the ECtHR was 
not convinced that by not granting the child identity (including citizenship) for more than two 
years, the State took into full account of the child’s best interests. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the ECtHR has been willing to grant recognition to families 
that have resorted to surrogacy agreements in order to have children. It is apparent after 
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy that such families enjoy protection from the State’s arbitrary 
interference in their family life from the early stages of their family life, irrespective of the 
fact whether the intended parents and their children are genetically linked or not. Furthermore, 
it follows from the judgement of Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy that the States have the 
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obligation to ensure that the child would be granted identity as early as possible, hence the 
States Parties have a limited margin of appreciation not to recognize the filiation of the 
children and their intended parents.  
The case law of the ECtHR concerning the recognition of families that have resorted to 
surrogacy is thus consistent with its practice in similar cases concerning families which have 
not gained legal recognition to their family ties. E.g. in Wagner and J.M.W.L. v 
Luxembourg
230
 the ECtHR adjudicated in a case that concerned adoption which did not gain 
legal recognition in the respondent State, although being legally recognized in Peru. The 
ECtHR examined the case under Art 8 ECHR and noted that the States have positive 
obligations inherent in the „effective „respect“ for family life.“231 In that regard, „where the 
existence of a family tie with a child has been established, the State must act in a manner 
calculated to enable that tie to be developed and establish legal safeguards that render possible 
the child's integration in his family.“232 Reiterating the necessity to protect the best interest of 
the child, the ECtHR found that the State „could not reasonably disregard the legal status 
validly created abroad and corresponding to a family life within the meaning of Art 8 
ECHR“233 and that the State „could not reasonably refuse to recognise the family ties that pre-
existed de facto between the applicants and thus dispense with an actual examination of the 
situation.“234 Thus, the ECtHR found that in light of the child’s best interest, the rights of the 
applicants under Art 8 ECHR were violated and that full legal recognition should have been 
granted to the family ties.  
It is interesting to note, however, that compared to the illegal adoption case, the ECtHR did 
not base its decisions in the surrogacy cases expressly on the reasoning that States have 
positive obligations to facilitate the enjoyment of family life under of Art 8 ECHR (the 
infringement of which the ECtHR did not establish neither in Mennesson v France nor in 
Labassee v France). Rather, the case law concerning surrogacy and the enjoyment of family 
life has been built on the argumentation about negative obligations the States have (the 
obligation to refrain from arbitrary interference in the family life) and have been based on the 
necessity to protect the rights of the child and the child’s identity under Art 8 ECHR. Hence, 
it may be noted that the ECtHR has been trying to take into account the States Parties’ 
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concerns without expressly forcing them to acknowledge the legal status of these families, but 
reaching the same outcome by different means – by bringing the child to the centre of its 
argumentation.  
The child-centred approach of the ECtHR in surrogacy matters corresponds to the reality of 
the phenomenon – namely surrogacy is aimed to produce a child whose position is often most 
vulnerable and often it is the child’s rights which are least considered and protected in the 
course of their conception, birth and life thereafter.
235
 Hence, by acknowledging and focusing 
on the children’s rights, the ECtHR has sent a powerful signal to States Parties to integrate 
children born through surrogacy in their societies and their families, a position constant with 
the aim to make child’s best interests a primary consideration in all actions relating to 
children. 
It is also noteworthy that the ECtHR has not touched upon the equal treatment of the intended 
parents and their family in regard to the hardships these families face in everyday matters in 
States Parties that do not legally recognize the family ties between commissioning parents and 
children born through surrogacy. However, if States Parties have, from the viewpoint of the 
ECtHR, reduced margin of appreciation regarding whether to recognize the legal parent-child 
relationship of the intended parents and their children, it logically follows that after 
recognizing such relationships, States cannot restrict such families from gaining equal access 
to benefits (including parental benefits) available for families which have gained legal 
recognition, especially so if the benefits are intended to guarantee the children’s best interests 
and welfare. Thus, the principle of equal treatment should be applicable to families that have 
resorted to surrogacy, especially as the aim of granting parental benefits is not limited to 
securing the parents’ position as a parent, but entails the protection of child’s best interests 
too. Equal access to parental benefits should thus include, among other things, childcare 
benefits from the state as these benefits aim to protect the children’s best interests and help 
the child integrate into its family, whereas the access to these benefits should be granted on 
equal footing regardless of the legal relationship extending to the family and birth conditions 
of the child, as evident from the judgement in Topčić-Rosenberg v Croatia.236  
Namely, in Topčić-Rosenberg v Croatia, the ECtHR found that discrimination on grounds of 
adoptive mother status regarding access to maternity leave, was prohibited under Art 8 ECHR 
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in conjunction with Art 14 ECHR
237
. The ECtHR held that „the purpose of parental or 
maternity leave is to enable [the parent] to stay at home to look after her child in which 
respect [the adoptive mother] is in a similar situation to a biological parent“238 and that „the 
State should refrain from taking any actions which could prevent the development of ties 
between the adoptive parents and their child and the integration of the child into the adoptive 
family.“239 Hence, the ECtHR found that the authorities’ refusal to grant maternity leave to 
the adoptive mother amounted to a breach of Art 8 ECHR and Art 14 ECHR. Thus, the EctHR 
has acknowledged that in any case, once a state grants recognition to a family, it cannot 
discriminate against such families’ entitlements, but must adhere to the principle of non-
discrimination within the meaning of Art 14 ECHR.  
In summary, compared to the practice of the CJEU, whereby the CJEU failed to take into 
account the children’s best interest and the equal treatment argument240, the ECtHR’s practice 
has been much more advanced concerning surrogacy-related cases. While it could be argued, 
that the ECtHR’s approach was taken in non-controversial surrogacy cases, as the cases were 
not, at first glance, connected to some of the most serious ethical and human rights issues that 
surrogacy can bring about
241
 – “the potential for child trafficking; coercion and exploitation of 
women acting as surrogates; reproductive rights, autonomy and health of women; issues of 
global injustice between more and less-developed states”242 – it is nevertheless hard to 
imagine a different outcome that would equally as well protect the children, having the most 
vulnerable position in surrogacy cases.  
Namely, the states have in their reach alternative means to deal with surrogacy-related human 
rights concerns – e.g. by agreeing on standards applicable to surrogacy and by monitoring the 
surrogate mother’s condition and verifying her consent and by agreeing on effective penalties 
in case where children are abandoned or mistreated. Also, in case where the children are being 
mistreated in their families, states remain free to interfere in the families’ arrangements on 
grounds of protecting the children’s welfare whenever there is reason to believe that the 
children’s welfare is seriously threatened or acutely at risk. In summary, states have effective 
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mechanisms to ensure that families would be oriented towards the child’s best upbringing, 
e.g. by removing the children from the parents’ custody where the children’s best interests are 
being genuinely impaired. With these alternatives in mind, it is hard to justify bringing more 
hardship in everyday matters to the children born through surrogacy by negating their 
identities and equal opportunities. Children should remain the primary concern in surrogacy 
cases, both in terms of their identities and equal access to measures aiming to protect their 
welfare (including parental benefits), a position consistent with Art 24(2) EUCFR. In that 
regard, to safeguard the children’s rights but also to provide protection to families as a unit, 
the prohibition of discrimination should equally apply to the intended parents’ claims to 
parental benefits as well. 
 
2.3. Estonian practice concerning parental benefits to fathers and commissioning 
parents 
In the previous subchapters, the practice of the CJEU and the ECtHR concerning equal access 
to parental benefits for fathers and atypical families was analysed. Next, the Estonian practice 
will be assessed to verify to which extent the current practice and legislation complies with 
the position of the two courts. 
 
2.3.1. Fathers’ entitlements to parental benefits 
To date, there has been no case law in the Estonian courts concerning discrimination on 
grounds of sex relating to fathers’ equal access to parental benefits. However, there have been 
a few occasions where the Estonian equality bodies have interpreted the parental benefits 
system in response to petitions submitted to these organs.  
In 2007, the Gender Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner submitted her opinion in 
response for the governments’ request for her analysis, regarding the provisions of the 
Parental Benefit Act that the Commissioner found to be discriminatory against fathers. 
Namely, according to § 2(2) of the Parental Benefit Act that was in force until 01.09.2007, 
mothers of the child were reserved non-transferable parental leave until the child reached the 
age of 6 months. In her opinion, the Gender Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner 
noted that the aforementioned provision mandated direct discrimination of men on grounds of 
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sex for which the Commissioner found no justification.
243
 The Commissioner distinguished 
between maternity leave and parental leave, stating that the aim of maternity leave is to 
protect women’s health in connection with pregnancy and childbirth and to transform the 
practice where women are often discriminated against on grounds of maternity; parental 
leave, on the other hand, is granted solely to facilitate childcare.
244
 Despite the 
aforementioned differentiation, the Commissioner nevertheless argued that it would be 
reasonable to reserve certain period of parental leave solely to mothers, namely the period 
corresponding to maternity leave (70 days) to which working mothers are entitled to, 
regardless whether the mother was employed before parental leave or not.
245
  
The latter argumentation could, however, be disputed. Namely, if parental leave is granted 
solely to facilitate the upbringing of children, both parents should, in principle, have equal 
access to parental leave. In that regard, the Parental Benefit Act is applicable not only to 
gestational parents but also to adoptive parents, step-parents and guardians or caregivers 
(§ 2(2) of the Parental Benefit Act), indicating that parental care could as effectively be given 
by all of the parental groups, whereas the mandatory period of parental leave is only 
applicable to the gestational (unemployed) mother. Gestational mothers who were gainfully 
employed before childbirth, are, on the other hand, not entitled to parental leave before the 
date following the final date of the certificate for maternity leave (§ 2(4) of the Parental 
Benefit Act), normally after the child attains 70 days of age. Thus, § 2(2) of the Parental 
Benefit Act has only limited scope, applying exclusively to gestational mothers that were 
unemployed before childbirth. While taking into account the period of maternity leave for the 
purpose of calculation of the period of parental leave is justified (maternity leave is, in part, 
aimed to protect the special relationship between a mother and her child after childbirth, thus 
it entails a parental care element), reserving a certain period of parental leave solely to 
gestational mothers under § 2(2) of the Parental Benefit Act, while allowing adoptive and 
guardian families themselves to determine the division of parental leave between the parents, 
might not be justified. Namely, as opposed to working gestational mothers, unemployed 
mothers face no pressure to return to work prematurely after childbirth. Thus, in these 
families, parents should be granted the freedom to decide which of the parents should benefit 
from parental leave because there is no reason to believe that the mother of the child would 
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otherwise be coerced by her employer to return prematurely to work before her recovery from 
childbirth.  
In 2011, similarly to the Gender Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner, the Chancellor 
of Justice assessed the purpose of maternity leave, reiterating the position of the Minister of 
Social Affairs, that maternity leave is designed to protect the biological condition of women 
after childbirth, the health of the newborn and also to protect the (emotional) relationship 
between the mother and her child.
246
 The Chancellor of Justice solved the petition of a father 
who claimed that the situation where the legislation does not expressly allow mothers to 
waive their maternity leave before the maximum period of maternity leave has ended, violated 
women’s rights under the constitution, namely the right to choose one’s profession freely.247 
The Chancellor of Justice, however, found that although the regulation enabled the 
interpretation that maternity leave was mandatory, it could more appropriately be interpreted 
as granting the right to maternity leave with maximum duration of 140 days, which the 
mother could waive.
248
 Thus, the Chancellor of Justice saw no violation of the constitution, as 
women are, under the current legislation free to return to work before the end of their 
maternity leave (which in Estonia lasts up to 140 days).  
Regrettably, the Chancellor of Justice did not analyse whether the legislation which 
encourages women to use full period of maternity leave by e.g. giving healthcare providers 
instructions to issue the certificate for maternity leave for the maximum maternity leave 
period (according to § 7(3) of the decree no 114 of the Minister of Social Affairs249); paying 
for maternity leave in advance on the basis of its maximum duration (under § 53(6) of the 
Health Insurance Act); tying the entitlement to receive parental benefit for parental leave with 
the final date of the certificate for maternity leave; and reducing the parental benefit for 
parental leave to minimum monthly wage (maximum rate) in the case where the mother who 
has right to pregnancy and maternity leave or maternity benefit does not exercise the right to 
pregnancy and maternity leave or maternity benefit (§ 2(4) and § 3(51) of the Parental Benefit 
Act), corresponds with the principle of equal treatment for men and women. It could easily be 
argued that if a mother could lawfully waive the right to maternity leave and decides not to 
use it in full, giving rise for the father’s entitlement to apply for parental leave and parental 
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benefit prematurely (i.e. before the date set under § 2(4) of the Parental Benefit Acr), the 
father should not lose out on the amount of parental benefit he would normally receive (i.e. in 
case the mother decides not to waive her right to maternity leave).  
As parental leave is granted for parents in their capacity as a parent, there should be no 
unequal treatment for men and women in terms applicable to parental leave. Hence, the 
situation is comparable to that in Roca Álvarez and Konstantinos Maïstrellis as parental 
benefit for parental leave is granted to parents in order to facilitate childcare, not for reasons 
relating to a woman’s pregnancy or childbirth. In their capacity as parents, men and women 
do not differ. Thus, while the PLD allows Member States to introduce the exact conditions for 
the take-up of parental leave (Clause 2(2) and Clause (3) PLD), it does not in any case allow 
for discrimination on grounds of sex, as the PLD is according to recitals (2) and (3) of the 
preamble to the PLD, expressly aimed to promote equality between men and women and 
reconciliation of professional, private and family life. Neither does it correspond with the aim 
of the PLD to introduce measures that discourage fathers’ take-up of parental leave. As 
§ 3(51) of the Parental Benefit Act, concerning the remuneration scheme for fathers that take 
parental leave early, inevitably discourages fathers to stay on parental leave in case the mother 
freely chooses not to use the maternity leave in full, the Chancellor of Justice could have 
found that the legislation amounted to direct discrimination on grounds of sex in terms of 
equal access to parental leave.  
The aforementioned finding could have been further substantiated by the fact that in Estonia 
mothers are granted a relatively long period of non-transferable maternity leave which largely 
(70 to 110 days) can be (and in practice is) taken after childbirth. Thus, the aim of maternity 
leave in Estonia is not unequivocally set on the protection of a mother’s biological condition 
and health, but can also, in part, relate to facilitating childcare.
250
 Thus, the legislation 
discouraging the fathers to stay on parental leave before the mothers have exhausted their 
right to a maximum period of maternity leave might be viewed as manifestly disproportionate, 
especially so if the mother freely chooses not to use the maternity leave in full. Namely, it is 
not reasonable to assume that mothers, in fact, would require up to 110 days for recovery of 
childbirth. In that regard, women’s health protection could as efficiently be guaranteed 
without encroaching on fathers’ right to take parental leave. 
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It can be noted thus, that in Estonia, the equality bodies have broadly taken up the reasoning 
of the CJEU concerning maternity leave by interpreting maternity leave as pursuing a twofold 
aim – the protection of women’s health, as well as the special relationship between a mother 
and a child (in that regard, the Gender Equality and Equal Treatment Commissioner has 
stressed more the health-related concerns
251
). What concerns the latter of the aims, the 
Estonian Chancellor of Justice has stressed that the special relationship between a mother and 
her child refers to emotional ties. In the rationale of the CJEU, it appears more related to 
breastfeeding concerns of the biological mothers, though, and to the necessity to protect 
women’s choices of whether to breastfeed her child or not. 
In summary, what concerns the scarce practice on equal access to parental leave, the Estonian 
equality bodies have not advanced equal access for men and women to parental leave 
schemes, by maintaining that non-transferable leave for mothers and the discouraging 
remuneration scheme for fathers, complies with the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women. In that regard, it is doubtful whether that position entirely complies with the aim of 
the PLD, as uttered in Konstantinos Maïstrellis – namely to increase women’s participation in 
the workforce and encourage fathers’ take up of parental leave. By discouraging fathers to 
take up parental leave, especially in the case where the mother has waived her right to (a 
relatively long) maternity leave, fathers might not have the incentives to take up their parental 
responsibilities from the early stages of the child’s development. Hence, the Estonian practice 
has advanced more the role of a mother as a caretaker, contrarily to the aim of the PLD. 
 
2.3.2. Commissioning parents’ entitlements to parental benefits 
In Estonia, there have been no cases concerning surrogacy to have reached the court. 
According to the findings of the ECtHR, however, while surrogacy is prohibited under § 132 
of the Penal Code
252
, it is possible under state’s practice to obtain legal recognition of the 
family ties between the commissioning parents and their children born through surrogacy 
either by way of the exequatur procedure
253
 or by way of direct transcription of the foreign 
judgement or birth certificate into the civil register or by way of gaining recognition to the 
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family ties through the adoption procedure.
254
 It follows that the commissioning parents 
should, after gaining recognition to the family ties between them and their children, be 
equally entitled to the same parental benefits that are available to families in which the family 
ties that have gained legal recognition. Hence, it appears that the Estonian practice, compared 
to the practice of the CJEU, is far more oriented on safeguarding the best interests of the 
child, and complies with the practice of the ECtHR in that regard that the children born 
through surrogacy will be granted identity and citizenship without delay. Also, considering 
that after gaining recognition to the family ties between the intended parents and their 
children, the parents should be equally entitled to the same parental benefits that are available 
to families in which the family ties have gained legal recognition, the issue of unequal 
treatment of atypical families does not arise. 
Nevertheless, Estonia has not enacted special provisions governing the procedure applicable 
to the recognition of family ties specifically in case of surrogacy, nor clearly formulated its 
public policy what concerns recognizing the family ties within the families that have resorted 
to surrogacy. As surrogacy is prohibited in Estonia, it should follow that under the Estonian 
public policy surrogacy is not tolerated, which in turn could influence the recognition of 
filiation between the intended parents and their children. However, considering the state 
practice referred to by the ECtHR, it can be assumed that Estonian public policy concerning 
the recognition of families that have resorted to surrogacy abroad is favourable to these 
families’ rights.  
Concerning the procedure applicable to the establishment of filiation between children born as 
a result of surrogacy agreements and the intended parents, there is no single applicable 
procedure to surrogacy cases under Estonian private international law, but there are multiple 
applicable procedures. Namely, filiation could be established under § 62 (special procedure 
concerning the establishment of filiation) or under § 63 (procedure governing adoption) of the 
Private International Law Act
255
 or by way of initiating the exequatur procedure under § 620 
of the Code of Civil Procedure (obtaining recognition to the foreign court order recognizing 
the rights of the intended parents) or by obtaining a direct transcription of the foreign 
judgement or birth certificate into the civil register. Depending on the procedure, in turn, the 
conditions for obtaining recognition to the family ties of the intended parents and the children 
born as a result of surrogacy agreements vary. E.g. the procedure of obtaining a direct 
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transcript of the children’s birth certificates to the civil register is confined only to formalities, 
thus it does not entail an assessment of the intended parents’ suitability. In contrast to the 
former procedure, the law applicable to the adoption procedure is that of the state of residence 
of the adoptive parents (§ 63(1) of the Private International Law Act). Thus, under the 
adoption procedure, the adoptive parents’ eligibility is assessed under Estonian law and 
couples that are denied the right to adopt a child under Estonian law could not obtain 
recognition to their filiation with the children either. In case of establishing filiation of the 
intended parents and their children under § 62 of the Private International Law Act, the 
procedure is, in turn, governed by the law of the state of residence of the child at the time of 
birth. Hence, the lack of a single procedure governing the recognition of filiation in cases of 
surrogacy, can lead to inconsistencies concerning the degree of scrutiny of the intended 
parents’ suitability and the choice of applicable law.  
In order to better formulate the conditions applicable to the recognition of filiation between 
the intended parents and their children in cases of surrogacy it would be recommendable for 
the Estonian legislator to adopt special legislation governing the procedure, e.g. in the 
example of the UK that is one of the first countries in Europe to have regulated the issue by 
adopting an accelerated adoption procedure applicable to such cases.
256
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Conclusion 
The thesis aimed to establish whether the legislation in force at the EU level as well as at 
national level in the field of parental benefits has reflected the development of parental roles 
and the emergence of atypical families. The thesis focused on the question whether the 
distinctions between different parents’ entitlements to parental benefits are justified in light of 
the principle of equality, the principle of equal treatment for men and women and in light of 
the protection of the rights’ of the child and the protection of family life as enshrined in 
Articles 7, 20, 21, 23, 24 and 33 EUCFR and Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. For the 
aforementioned purpose, the thesis compared the practice of the CJEU and the ECtHR and 
assessed the legislation in force at the EU level as well as at national level.  
In summary, it can be noted that in the field of parental benefits (i.e. foremost concerning the 
right to maternity/parental leave and positive discrimination measures as analysed for the 
purpose of the thesis), the EU legislation differs significantly as to the entitlements of parents 
of different sexes. While the principle of equal treatment for men and women under Art 14 
ETD should, in that regard, be an overarching principle in EU law in the field of parental 
benefits
257
, there are exceptions to the applicability of the ETD in the field of parental 
benefits. Namely, the ETD is without prejudice to measures taken under the PWD and the 
PLD and it is also possible to introduce positive discrimination measures under Art 3 ETD.  
Depending on the nature of the measure (i.e. maternity-related, positive discrimination related 
etc), the CJEU has applied different standards of scrutiny in cases initiated by fathers 
concerning equal access to the contested measures. In that regard, the CJEU has shown the 
greatest reluctance in assessing the discriminatory nature of parental benefits introduced for 
pregnancy or maternity-related considerations, primarily maternity leave within the meaning 
of the PWD. The CJEU has ruled in numerous cases that maternity leave as guaranteed under 
the PWD, is designed to protect a woman’s biological condition before and after childbirth 
and also to protect the special relationship between a mother and her child. Thus, maternity 
leave currently pursues a double aim – on the one hand it is introduced for health-related 
considerations and on the other it also facilitates the exercise of a mother’s special parental 
role (which can be understood as protecting women’s choice to breastfeed their children). As 
the CJEU has interpreted the aim of maternity leave widely, it has not engaged itself with the 
assessment whether maternity leave schemes could be regarded as measures granted, in fact, 
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to mothers in their parental capacity, but has relied on the fact that measures enacted in 
compliance with the PWD are outside the scope of the ETD. Rulings such as Hofmann and 
Montull confirm that the CJEU has left the Member States a wide discretion in deciding on 
the access conditions (e.g. in Montull, adoptive parents and mothers enjoyed primary right to 
the leave with the sole exclusion of biological fathers who enjoyed a derivative right to leave) 
and duration of maternity leave (in Hofmann, the duration of maternity leave extended even to 
6 months). 
While it can be agreed that it is difficult to decide when maternity leave introduced under the 
PWD, in fact, exceeds the protection granted under the PWD inasmuch as to constitute a 
measure granted, in most part, for parenting reasons, it could still be argued that introducing 
longer maternity leaves exclusively for mothers should include weighty reasons for excluding 
fathers options to exercise their parental duties under similar conditions. Namely, introducing 
long maternity leaves almost immune to scrutiny by the CJEU is liable to perpetuate 
traditional parental roles in a family and thus it does not facilitate achieving substantive 
equality between the sexes. Hence, introducing long maternity leaves vastly exceeding the 
protection required under the PWD should be open to more scrutiny to ensure that the right 
balance is struck between securing women’s interests for sex-specific reasons and fathers’ 
equal treatment facilitating the exercise of their parental roles.  
In that regard, the practice of the ECtHR seems more open to guaranteeing the parents’ equal 
access to maternity benefits. Namely, the ECtHR has not interpreted the aim of maternity 
leave as widely as the CJEU, pointing out mainly health-related considerations. 
On the other hand, the CJEU has been more prone to scrutinise measures introduced with a 
view to eliminate de facto inequalities between men and women under Art 3 ETD in the field 
of parental benefits. In the cases concerning positive discrimination measures, the CJEU 
employs the prohibition of discrimination under Art 14 ETD and assesses the proportionality 
of the contested measure more strictly. However, it does not follow that the CJEU has often 
struck down such measures for being discriminatory towards fathers. On the contrary, the 
CJEU has been rather cautious in expanding the entitlements to childcare measures introduced 
within the meaning of Art 3 ETD to fathers. In that regard, the practice of the CJEU has not 
been consistent with the aim of securing substantive equality for the sexes and striking down 
outdated perceptions of parental roles. It can be agreed with AG Jacobs that measures 
facilitating childcare should not be made available only to women as it presupposes that 
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women should have primary responsibility for childcare and as it reinforces the perception of 
women as primary caretakers within the families.  
The most progressive case law of the CJEU concerning fathers’ equal access to parental 
benefits has been in cases where parental benefits have been made available primarily with 
the aim to facilitate childcare for parents acting in their capacity as parents. In such cases, the 
CJEU has ruled that the exclusion of fathers from being entitled to parental benefits is not 
founded and such measures are more likely to be struck down for being discriminatory 
towards fathers on grounds of sex. Also, the CJEU’s view on equal access to parental leave 
under the PLD has been advanced in that the CJEU has stressed the need to bring about more 
substantive equality for the sexes by encouraging especially fathers to take up parental leave, 
thus aiming to change the traditional perception of roles of men and women in a family. 
In regard to positive discrimination measures the ECtHR, likewise, acknowledges the 
possibility to introduce such measures in correspondence with Art 14 ECHR, subject to such 
measures’ proportionality review. Thus, the two courts’ methodologies of judicial review in 
the field of positive discrimination measures correspond to each other. Also, in the field of 
parental leave the ECtHR has allowed States Parties a narrow margin of appreciation in 
deciding on equal access to benefits granted for parenting reasons, finding that advancing 
equality between the sexes is one of the priorities for States Parties. The ECtHR has thus 
noted that where a state decides to introduce parental benefits, it must do so adhering to the 
principle of equal treatment and very weighty reasons must be given to substantiate the 
exclusion of similarly situated groups from being entitled to the benefit.  
Regarding access to parental benefits for atypical families (i.e. families that have resorted to 
surrogacy), it can be noted that the CJEU has taken a cautious approach ruling on their 
entitlements under EU anti-discrimination law. Namely, in the cases studied (C.D. v S.T. and 
Z v A Government Department), the CJEU ruled that neither the PWD nor the ETD apply to 
the discrimination claims of the intended parents. While AG Kokott stressed the importance 
of human rights protection, especially the protection of the best interests of the child and 
respect for family life, and came to the opposite conclusion what concerns the applicability of 
the PWD to intended mothers, the CJEU followed a strict line of argumentation ruling against 
the intended mothers’ claims.  
In comparison, the ECtHR has been bringing the rights of the child in the centrepiece of the 
surrogacy cases. The ECtHR has recognised that despite the wide margin of appreciation the 
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States Parties have in ethically sensitive areas, the best interests of the child should 
nevertheless be given primary concern, which in turn limits the states’ margin of appreciation. 
Thus, in its first surrogacy cases the EctHR has ruled that, having in mind the need to protect 
the children’s best interests, States Parties have to protect such children’s identity by 
recognizing their filiation with their intended parents. By acknowledging and focusing on the 
children’s rights, the ECtHR has sent a powerful signal to States Parties to integrate children 
born through surrogacy in their societies and their families.  
Based on the findings of the ECtHR, urging the States Parties to grant legal recognition to 
families that have resorted to surrogacy, it logically follows that after recognizing such 
relationships States Parties cannot restrict such families from gaining equal access to benefits 
(including parental benefits) available for families which have gained legal recognition, 
especially if the benefits are intended to guarantee the children’s best interests and welfare. 
Thus, the principle of equal treatment should be applicable to families that have resorted to 
surrogacy, especially as the aim of granting parental benefits is not limited to securing the 
parents’ position, but entails the protection of child’s best interests too. Equal access to 
parental benefits should thus include, among other things, childcare benefits from the state as 
they aim to protect the children’s best interests and help the child integrate into its family. 
Concerning Estonian legislation and practice in the field of equal access to the examined 
parental benefits by fathers and atypical families, it can be concluded that Estonian legislation 
on maternity leave corresponds to the PWD. Also, Estonian legislation corresponds to the 
ETD in regard to the guarantees examined for the purpose of the thesis. However, Estonian 
legislation on parental leave needs updating to ensure its conformity with the aim sought by 
the PLD. While in Estonia, the entitlement to parental leave exceeds the minimum period 
required under the PLD and is adequately remunerated, the regulation does not comply with 
the aim of ensuring substantial equality for men and women by promoting more equal burden-
sharing of childcare obligations. The latter aim could be achieved if parental leave would be 
divided into non-transferable periods of parental leave for each of the parents, as suggested 
under Clause 2(2) PLD, or in case of introducing transferable parental leave scheme, by 
granting a period of non-transferable parental leave to fathers only. 
In the Estonian practice, the equality bodies have broadly taken up the reasoning of the CJEU 
concerning maternity leave by interpreting maternity leave as pursuing a twofold aim – the 
protection of women’s health, as well as the special relationship between a mother and a 
child. What concerns the latter of the aims, the Estonian equality bodies have stressed that the 
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special relationship between a mother and her child refers to emotional ties. In the rationale of 
the CJEU, it appears more related to breastfeeding concerns, though, and thus to the necessity 
to protect women’s choices of whether to breastfeed her child or not. 
Concerning the scarce practice on equal access to parental leave, the Estonian equality bodies 
have not advanced equal access for men and women to parental leave schemes, by 
maintaining that non-transferable leave for mothers and the discouraging remuneration 
scheme of parental leave for fathers, complies with the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women. In that regard, it is doubtful whether the Estonian practice entirely complies with 
the aim of the PLD, as uttered in Konstantinos Maïstrellis – namely to increase women’s 
participation in the workforce and encourage fathers’ take up of parental leave. By 
discouraging fathers to take up parental leave, especially in the case where the mother has 
waived her right to (a relatively long) maternity leave fathers might not have the incentives to 
take up their parental responsibilities from the early stages of the child’s development. Hence, 
the Estonian practice advances more the role of a mother as a caretaker, contrarily to the aim 
of the PLD. 
According to the study of the ECtHR, the Estonian practice on equal access to parental 
benefits for families that have resorted to surrogacy is, however, more liberal than the practice 
of the CJEU. Namely, it is possible to gain full recognition to the family ties between the 
intended parents and their children, regardless of the prohibition of surrogacy. Hence, it 
follows that commissioning parents should, after gaining recognition to the family ties 
between them and their children, be equally entitled to the same parental benefits that are 
available to families in which the family ties that have gained legal recognition and that the 
issue of unequal treatment of atypical families does not arise. However, concerning the lack 
of single applicable procedure to the matter, it would be recommendable for the Estonian 
legislator to formulate its practice and conditions on recognition of filiation between the 
intended parents and their children by adopting special legislation to govern the procedure. 
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Kokkuvõte 
Käesolevas töös "Õigus lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkustele ja hüvedele EL 
mittediskrimineerimisõiguses: lapsevanemate õiguste eristamine soo alusel ning atüüpiliste 
perede õiguste eristamine" uuritakse lapsevanemate õigusi lapse hooldamisega seotud 
puhkustele ja hüvitistele Euroopa Liidu (edaspidi EL) mittediskrimineerimisõiguse kontekstis. 
Töö eesmärgiks on tuvastada, mil määral EL mittediskrimineerimisõiguses eristatakse eri 
soost vanemate õigusi lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkustele ning hüvedele ning mil määral 
laieneb õigus kasutada lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkusi atüüpilistele peredele, esmajoones 
surrogaatemaduse teenuse abil lapsevanemaks saanutele. Töös hinnatakse, kas eri soost 
vanemate õiguste eristamine ning atüüpiliste perede õiguste eristamine lapse hooldamisega 
seotud puhkuste ning hüvede kontekstis vastab mittediskrimineerimise põhimõttele, samuti 
mil määral on selline praktika kooskõlas laste õiguste kaitsega ja pereelu kaitsega Euroopa 
Põhiõiguste Harta art 7, art 20, art 21, art 23, art 24 ja art 33 alusel ning Euroopa Inimõiguste 
Konventsiooni art 8 ning art 14 alusel. Sel eesmärgil käsitletakse töös ka Euroopa Kohtu ja 
Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu praktikat antud valdkonnas ning võrreldakse, kas kohtute 
seisukohad ühtivad selles küsimuses.  
Käesolev töö põhineb eelkõige Euroopa Kohtu ja Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu lahenditel ning 
töö uurimisvaldkonnaga seotud EL direktiividel – direktiivil 2006/54 (nn võrdse kohtlemise 
direktiiv), direktiivil 92/85 (nn rasedate töötajate kaitse direktiiv) ja direktiivil 2010/18 (nn 
direktiiv vanemapuhkuse kohta). Töö fookusest tulenevalt on õiguskirjandusel 
(mittediskrimineerimisõiguse alased teatmikud ning artiklid) üksnes toetav roll, selgitamaks 
töös käsitletavate õigusaktide eesmärki ning mittediskrimineerimise põhimõtte allikaid ja 
kohaldamisala. Töö fookuses on kohtupraktika analüüs esmajoones seetõttu, et hinnata, 
kuidas töös käsitletavaid direktiive on tõlgendatud ning kuidas need õigusaktid omavahel 
praktikas suhestuvad. Kohtupraktika analüüsi ning kõrvutamise käigus hinnatakse, kuidas 
kohtud on inimõiguste kaitse argumenti õigusaktide tõlgendamisel arvesse võtnud. Samuti 
hinnatakse töös siseriikliku seadusandluse vastavust käsitletavate EL õigusaktide eesmärgile 
ning Euroopa Kohtu ja Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu praktikas toodud seisukohtadele. 
Lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkused ning meetmed, millega soodustatakse lapse hooldamist 
ning mis oma olemuselt on võimelised mõjutama töötajate tööaega, töölt puudumist vm 
töötingimusi, kuuluvad töötingimuste valdkonda direktiivi 2006/54 tähenduses, millest 
tulenevalt laieneb lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkuste ja hüvede määramise tingimustele 
soolise diskirmineerimise keeld direktiivi 2006/54 art 14(1)(c) alusel. Kuigi direktiivi 2006/54 
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art 14(1)(c) alusel on võimalik vaidlustada meetmeid, millega ühele sugupoolele 
võimaldatakse eksklusiivselt lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkuseid ja hüvesid, on direktiivide 
92/85 ja direktiivi 2006/54 art 3 ja art 157(4) ELTL alusel lubatud üht sugupoolt kaitsvad 
erimeetmed. Selliste meetmetega võimaldatakse vastavalt rasedate töötajate, vastselt 
sünnitanud ning imetavate töötajate kaitse (sh emaduspuhkus) ning positiivse 
diskrimineerimise valdkonda kuuluvad erimeetmed, mille eesmärgiks on soolise ebavõrdsuse 
vähendamine alaesindatud soole eeliste andmise kaudu.  
Töös käsitletud kohtupraktika põhjal on võimalik järeldada, et Euroopa Kohtu praktikas on 
emaduspuhkuse eesmärki tõlgendatud laialt – emaduspuhkus ei ole suunatud üksnes rasedate 
töötajate, vastselt sünnitanud töötajate ja imetavate töötajate tervise kaitsele, aga ka ema ja 
lapse vahelise erilise sideme loomisele. Emaduspuhkuse laia eesmärgi tõttu on Euroopa 
Kohus isade kaebusi lahendades olnud väga ettevaatlik emaduspuhkuse tingimuste hindamisel 
soolise võrdse kohtlemise aspektist ning asunud seisukohale, et emaduspuhkuse tingimused 
asuvad väljaspool direktiivi 2006/54 kohaldamisala. Euroopa Kohus on hoidunud 
emaduspuhkuse tingimuste hindamisest muuhulgas kaasuste puhul, milles siseriikliku 
seadusandluse alusel ei ole emaduspuhkuse eesmärk olnud täielikult seotud naiste tervise 
kaitse aspektiga, milles emaduspuhkus on jaotatud kohustusliku ning vabatahtliku puhkuse 
perioodideks aga ka eriliselt pikkade (nt 6 kuud) emaduspuhkuste puhul. Eelnevast tulenevalt 
on isade kaebused emaduspuhkuse tingimuste vaidlustamisel soolise võrdse kohtlemise 
aspektist olnud edutud.  
Ka Eesti seadusandja ning ebavõrdse kohtlemise kaebusi lahendavad institutsioonid 
(sotsiaalminister, õiguskantsler, soolise võrdõiguslikkuse ja võrdse kohtlemise volinik) on 
emaduspuhkuse eesmärki ja emaduspuhkuse laiendamise võimalust isadele hinnanud 
sarnaselt Euroopa Kohtuga. Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu praktikas seevastu on 
emaduspuhkuse eesmärki tõlgendatud kitsamalt naiste tervise kaitse aspektist, mistõttu isadel 
on olnud lihtsam vaidlustada emaduspuhkuse tingimusi soolise võrdse kohtlemise aspektist, 
mh juhtudel, kui emaduspuhkus teenib naiste tervise kaitse eesmärgi kõrval enam lapse 
hooldamise eesmärki.  
Töö autor on seisukohal, et sugupoolte sisulise võrdõiguslikkuse tagamiseks peaks 
seadusandja tagama, et pikkade emaduspuhkuste puhul, mis teenivad naistöötajate tervise 
kaitsest enam lapse hooldamise eesmärki, oleks sugupoolte võrdse kohtlemise seisukohast 
vajalik, et ka isadele võimaldataks puhkust samadel tingimustel. Nimelt on isad vanemlikus 
rollis samaväärselt emadega võimelised last hooldama, mistõttu üksnes emadele pikkade 
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emaduspuhkuste võimaldamine toetab traditsiooniliste soorollide püsimist ega vasta soolise 
võrdse kohtlemise põhimõttele. Seetõttu peaks seadusandja pikkade emaduspuhkuste, mis 
ületavad märkimisväärselt direktiivi 92/85 alusel nõutavat miinimumkaitset, kehtestamise 
puhul püüdma enam arvesse võtta soolise võrdse kohtlemise argumenti. 
Positiivse diskrimineerimise meetmete puhul on Euroopa Kohus seevastu hinnanud rangemalt 
lapse hooldamist soodustavate meetmete eesmärgipärasust ning selliste meetmete tingimuste 
vastavust proportsionaalsuse põhimõttele. Kuigi Euroopa Kohtu praktikas on kohus harva 
tunnistanud positiivse diskrimineerimise meetmeid ebaproportsionaalseks isade võrdse 
kohtlemise aspektist, läbivad sellised meetmed rangema proportsionaalsuse kontrolli 
võrreldes nt emaduspuhkusega (mille tingimused loetakse direktiivi 2006/54 kohaldamisalast 
välja jäävateks). Euroopa Kohtuga sarnaselt kasutab ka Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus oma 
praktikas sama metoodikat. Samas on Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus soolise diskrimineerimise 
kaasustes toonud välja, et soolist ebavõrdsust kinnistavad meetmed on õigustatud üksnes väga 
kaalukatel põhjustel. Seega on Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus soolise võrdse kohtlemise 
kaasustes rakendanud väga ranget proportsionaalsuse kontrolli, võttes arvesse, et soolise 
võrdõiguslikkuse edendamine on Euroopa Inimõiguste Konventsiooni osalisriikide jaoks 
prioriteetne eesmärk. 
Käesoleva töö autor toetab kohtujurist Jacobsi seisukohta, et lapse hooldamist soodustavate 
positiivse diskrimineerimise meetmete puhul ei peaks selliseid meetmeid (nt tööandja poolt 
üksnes naistele lastehoiukohtade võimaldamine) põhimõtteliselt võimaldama üksnes emadele. 
Seda eriti juhtudel, kui samaväärne sooneutraalne meede viiks naiste tööhõive aspektist 
samadele tulemustele ehk juhul, kui meetme tõhusus ei ole tõendatud. Positiivse 
diskrimineerimise meetmed lapse hooldamist soodustavates küsimustes peaksid seega enam 
soodustama isade vanemliku rolli täitmist. 
Euroopa Kohus on soolisele võrdõiguslikkusele enim rõhku pööranud aga vanemapuhkuse 
saamise tingimusi hinnates. Nimelt on Euroopa Kohus leidnud, et vanemapuhkuse eesmärk 
direktiivi 2010/18 mõttes on sugupoolte võrdõiguslikkuse sisuline tagamine ning seetõttu on 
eriliselt oluline soodustada isasid vanemapuhkust kasutama. Euroopa Kohtu praktikas on 
seega isade vanemapuhkuse saamist takistavaid tingimusi liikmesriikide seadusandluses 
peetud diskrimineerivaks sooga seotud asjaolude alusel. 
Töö autor on seisukohal, et Eesti vanemahüvitise saamise tingimused direktiivi 2010/18 ning 
Euroopa Kohtu praktikas väljendatud eesmärki ei soodusta, kuivõrd vanemahüvitise seaduse 
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§ 2 lg 2 alusel on vaid (mittetöötavatel) emadel õigus vanemahüvitisele esimesel 70 päeval 
ning isadel samalaadset ainuõigust ei ole. Samuti makstakse vanemahüvitist vanemahüvitise 
seaduse § 3 lg 51 alusel lapsehoolduspuhkusele jäänud isale vaid miinimummääras, kui lapse 
ema ei ole soovinud rasedus- ja sünnituspuhkust maksimummääras (140 päeva) kasutada. 
Nimetatud tingimused ei soodusta isade osavõttu lapse hooldamisest lapse arengu varajastest 
staadiumitest alates ega täida isade võrdse kohtlemise eesmärki. Kuivõrd vanemapuhkus (ning 
sellega lahutamatult seotud vanemahüvitis) on meede, mis toetab esmajoones vanemliku rolli 
täitmist, peaks vanemahüvitist võimaldama mõlemale sugupoolele võrdsetel alustel, mistõttu 
eeltoodud vanemahüvitise saamise tingimused on diskrimineerivad isade suhtes. Samuti on 
vanemahüvitis Eestis kehtestatud sooneutraalsena. Selleks aga, et soodustada isade 
aktiivsemat osavõttu lapse hooldamisest ning toetada sugupoolte võrdõiguslikkust praktikas, 
oleks direktiivi 2010/18 eesmärki arvesse võttes soovitav, kui Eesti seadusandja kehtestaks 
osa lapsehoolduspuhkusest ülekantamatu puhkusena üksnes isadele. 
Atüüpilistele peredele lapse hooldamisega seotud puhkuste võimaldamise osas on Euroopa 
Kohus aga olnud kõige konservatiivsem, leides, et emaduspuhkus ei laiene surrogaatemaduse 
teenuse abil emaks saanud vanemale ka juhul, kui ema imetab oma last ning leidnud, et õigus 
saada emaduspuhkust laieneb üksnes bioloogilisele emale. Selline seisukoht ei taga töö autori 
hinnangul aga lapse õiguste kõrgetasemelist kaitset, nagu seda nõuab Euroopa Põhiõiguste 
Harta art 24(2). Nimelt tuleb Euroopa Põhiõiguste Harta art 24(2) alusel seada laste õiguste 
kaitse esikohale kõikide lapsi puudutavate meetmete rakendamise puhul, mis tähendab, et 
lastele tuleb tagada arenguks ning vanemlikuks kontaktiks samaväärsed võimalused, 
sõltumata nende sünniga seotud asjaoludest.  
Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohus on seevastu laste õiguste kõrgetasemelise kaitse vajaduse toonud 
esiplaanile, leides, et surrogaatemaduse abil vanemaks saanute ning nende laste vahelisi 
sugulussidemeid tuleb õiguslikult tunnustada, rõhutades seega selliste laste integreerimise 
vajadust nende perekondadesse ja kohalikesse ühiskondadesse. Kuigi Euroopa Inimõiguste 
Kohus ei ole veel lahendanud surrogaatemaduse läbi vanemaks saanute õiguste küsimust 
lapse hooldamisega seotud meetmetele, on Euroopa Inimõiuste Kohus teisi atüüpilisi peresid 
puudutavates kaasustes toonud välja riigi kohustuse laiendada lapse hooldamisega seotud 
meetmeid ka atüüpilistele peredele, kuna sellised meetmed aitavad last perekonda integreerida 
ning tagavad laste õiguste kõrgetasemelise kaitse eesmärki. Eelnevast tulenevalt, arvestades et 
riikidel on kohustus tunnustada surrogaatemaduse teenust kasutanud peresid ning arvestades 
Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu praktikas esile toodud laste õiguste kõrgetasemelise kaitse 
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vajadust ka surrogaatemaduse teenuse läbi sündinud laste puhul, võib sellest järeldada, et 
atüüpiliste perede kaasustes toodud järeldused lapse hooldamisega seotud hüvede suhtes 
kehtivad ühtviisi ka surrogaatemaduse teenust kasutanud peredele. 
Eesti seadusandluses ei ole surrogaatemaduse teenust kasutanud peresid eristatud teistest 
riikliku kaitse all olevatest peredest, mistõttu Eestis surrogaatemaduse teenust kasutanud 
perede ebavõrdse kohtlemise küsimus ei tõusetu. Kuigi Eestis on surrogaatemadus keelatud, 
on Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtus oma lahendis Labassee v Prantsusmaa välja toonud, et Eestis 
on võimalik saada selliste perede vanemate ja laste vahelistele sugulussuhetele õiguslik 
tunnustus. Samas ei ole kohalduvate seaduste alusel (tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik, 
rahvusvahelise eraõiguse seadus) kehtestatud ühtset protseduuri ja tingimusi 
surrogaatemaduse teenust kasutanud perede sisestele suguslussidemetele tunnustuse 
saamiseks ning erinevate protseduuride alusel tuleb sellistel peredel täita erinevaid tingimusi, 
mh võib erineda menetlusele kohaldatav õigus. Eelnevast tulenevalt oleks soovitav, et Eesti 
seadusandja kehtestaks ühtse menetluse surrogaatemaduse teenust kasutanud perede siseste 
sugulussidemete tunnustamiseks.  
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